Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

George Bryce Rappleye v. Marilyn Rappleye : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen Quesenberry; J. Bryan Quesenberry; Hilll; Johnson & Schmutz; Attorneys for Appellants.
Matt C. Osborne; Osborne & Barnhill; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Rappleye v. Rappleye, No. 20030074 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4171

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE BRYCE RAPPLEYE,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appellant/Defendant,

Trial Court Case No. 894406626
MARILYN RAPPLEYE, nka
MARILYN JOHNSON,

Appellate Case No. 20030074- CA

Appellee/Plaintiff.

Appeal From the Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre

Stephen Quesenberry (8073)
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
3319 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendant

Matt C. Osborne (7271)
OSBORNE & BARNHELL, P.C.
11576 South State Street, Bldg. 204
Draper, Utah 84020
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff

ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 15

FILED,
Utah Court of Appear

NOV 2 5 2003
Paulette Stagg
<-i*rif nf the Court

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE BRYCE RAPPLEYE,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appellant/Defendant,
v.
Trial Court Case No. 894406626
MARILYN RAPPLEYE, nka
MARILYN JOHNSON,

Appellate Case No. 20030074- CA

Appellee/Plaintiff.
Appeal From the Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah
The Honorable Donald J. Eyre

Stephen Quesenberry (8073)
J. Bryan Quesenberry (9156)
HEX, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
3319 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604
Attorneys for Appellants/Defendant

Matt C. Osborne (7271)
OSBORNE & BARNHILL, P.C.
11576 South State Street, Bldg. 204
Draper, Utah 84020
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff

ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 15

LIST OF THE PARTIES
1.

Appellant/Defendant is George Bryce Rappleye.

2.

Appellee/Plaintiff is Marilyn Rappleye, now known as Marilyn Johnson.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents

iii

Table of Authorities

v

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues

1

Determinative Statutory or Other Provisions

4

Statement of Relevant Facts

4

Summary of the Arguments

20

Argument
I.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That The Discovery Rule Tolled The Applicable Statutes
Of Limitations
22
a.

The Concealment Prong Of The Discovery Rule Applies to Plaintiffs Claim Of
Fraudulent Transfer
22

b.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That The Concealment Prong Of The Discovery
Rule Applies To Plaintiffs Claim For Fraudulent Transfer In Addition To The
Statutory Discovery Rule Contained In The Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act
28

c.

Plaintiffs Constructive Trust Claim Is Also Subject To The Discovery Rule . . 3 1

II.

Erroneous Application Of The Common Law Discovery Rule By The Trial Court Would
Constitute Harmless Error In This Case
34

HI.

The Court Of Appeals Must Consider The Trial Court's Finding Of Fact To Be Proper As
Rappleye Failed To Request The Entire Transcript Of The Proceeding or To Properly
Marshall The Evidence
34
a.

Rappleye Failed To Request The Transcript For The Entire Proceeding

36

b.

Rappleye Also Failed To Marshal The Evidence

37

iii

IV.

V.

The Court Has Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Rappleye's Property Placed Under Hodges
Name
41
a.

The Trial Court Made A Determination That The Transfer Was Fraudulent And
Hodges' Interests Were Represented Throughout The Proceeding
42

b.

Full Faith And Credit Has No Application In This Case

44

c.

Full Faith And Credit Has No Application In This Case

45

The Trial Court Was Not Clearly Erroneous In Determining Rappleye And Hodges'
Interests In The Branson Property

Conclusion

-.

Appendix

IV

47
48

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A.

Cases

Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah App. 1996)

29, 30

Aragon v. Clover Club Foods, Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993)

29

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987)

35

Aurora Credit Serv. v. Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1988)

1, 2, 3, 23, 24

Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993)

25

Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996)

1,3,22,23,24,27,31

Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1998)

31

Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App.)

42

Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d425 (Utah 1998)

38

Hillv. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 2001)

24, 26

Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974)

44

Jensen v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997)

2,4, 23

Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)

38

Klingerv. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990)

30

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.,
758 P.2d 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

31

Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 WL 33249399 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (unpublished edition) . . 32
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. 78 P.3d 616 (Utah Ct. App. 2003)
v

6
26,27

Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1993

38

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

37

Selvage v. JJ. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

29, 30

Smith v. Edwards, 17 P.2d 264 (Utah 1932)

25

Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d763 (Utah 1985)

37

Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002)

1, 2, 3,22

State ex. rel. W.A., 63 P.3d607 (Utah2002)

2

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998)

42

State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

35

State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

34

State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

41

Stine v. Girola, 337 P.2d 62 (Utah 1959)

44

Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999)

35

Valcarcev Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998)

38

Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978)

23

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992)

23

White v. Gary L. Desselhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994)

2, 3

Witear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

38

Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

38

vi

B.

Statutes

Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1)
Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann, § 25-6-8(2)

29, 35
45

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(j)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-5(4) and (9)

45

76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 200 (1992)
UtahR. Civ. P. 61

34

UtahR. Civ. P. 69(s)

44

UtahR. App. P. 11(e)(2)

37

vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3,
this Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the Trial Court properly rule that the concealment prong of the
common law discovery rule applied in this case in addition to the statutory discovery rule
contained in the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act (Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1))?
Standard of appellate review:

Correction of error/clearly erroneous. The

applicability of statutes of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are
questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah
2002) (citations omitted). "However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the
discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination - - the point at which a
person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a
question of fact. Accordingly, appellate courts review for correctness, incorporating a
clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when
plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries." Id. (citations omitted).
Whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies to a specific set of facts is a
question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Aurora Credit Serv. v.
Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998)fciting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45,
53 (Utah 1996) ('The application of this rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a
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matter left to trial courts and finders of fact.")); Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d
327, 334 (Utah 1997).
Issue 2:

Did the Trial Court properly find that Plaintiff could not have

discovered the fraudulent transfer at issue herein until April, 2001?
Standard of Appellate Review:

Clearly erroneous. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d

742, 753 (Utah 2002) ("The point at which a person reasonably should know that he or
she has suffered a legal injury is a question of fact."); Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty
West, 970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (What a reasonably person would have known or
done in specific circumstances is a question of fact).
Issue 3:

Did the Trial Court have jurisdiction to attach the proceeds of the

Fidelity Investment account under the name of Hodges?
Standard of Appellate Review:

Correction of error. White v. Gary L.

Desselhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
Issue 4:

Did the Trial Court properly determine Rappleye's and Hodges'

interests in the proceeds from the sale of the Branson Property?
Standard of Appellate Review:

Clearly erroneous. State ex. rel. W.A., 63 P.3d

607,611 (Utah 2002).
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Issue 5:

Did the Trial Court give full faith and credit to the Missouri

court's Decree of Dissolution of Marriage which awarded Hodges $410,000.00 (which
amount included the proceeds from the sale of the Branson Property) and Rappleye
$506.00?
Standard of Appellate Review:

Correction of error. White v. Gary L.

Desselhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).
Issue 6:

Is Plaintiffs constructive trust claim barred by the applicable statute

of limitations?
Standard of Appellate Review: Correction of error/clearly erroneous. The
applicability of statutes of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are
questions of law to be reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753 (Utah
2002) (citations omitted). "However, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the
discovery rule also involves a subsidiary factual determination - - the point at which a
person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a
question of fact. Accordingly, appellate courts review for correctness, incorporating a
clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when
plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal injuries." Id. (citations omitted).
Whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies to a specific set of facts is a
question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Aurora Credit Serv. v.
Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (citing Berenda v. Langfordf 914 P.2d 45,
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53 (Utah 1996) ("The application of this rule to any particular set of facts is necessarily a
matter left to trial courts and finders of fact/')); Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d
327, 334 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY OR OTHER PROVISIONS
The dispositive statutes and rules are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" to the
Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On or around April 25,1991, a Decree of Divorce ('Original Decree of

Divorce") was entered in the Fourth District Court, Wasatch County, between
Defendant/Appellant George Bryce Rappleye ("Rappleye"). (R at 156 - 158; 425, K 1.)
In May of 1991, Rappleye filed a Notice of Appeal and Plaintiff in response crossappealed. (R at 223; 230; 1425, f 2.)
2.

On May 20, 1991, Rappleye married Linda Jean Hodges ("Hodges").

(Rat 1425,1J3; 1532.)
3.

On October 19, 1992, Rappleye and Hodges, entered into a Real Estate

Purchase Contract with Edwin Michel and Duvall Investments, Inc. dba Michel's Motor
Lodge to Purchase 33 acres of real property located in Branson, Missouri for $330,000.00
cash. (R at 1425, ^ 6; 1451, pg. 47:2-3; 1530-1531) (see Appendix, Exhibit "B").
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4.

On January 4, 1993, Rappleye and Hodges closed the Earnest Money

Sales Agreement to purchase real property and assets generally know as the Branson Lake
Resort (the "Branson Property") in Branson, Missouri, for the purchase price of
$330,000.00, which was paid in cash. At closing, Rappleye executed the HUD settlement
statement. Rappleye and Hodges (under the name Linda Jean Rappleye) jointly took title
to the Branson Property by Warranty Deed as "husband and wife." (R at 1425, f 7; 1451,
pg. 47:5-9; 1530-1531.) (see Appendix, Exhibit "C'\)
5.

Rappleye paid approximately one-half of the purchase price of

$330,000.00 for the Branson Property using proceeds from the sale of certain Fidelity
Investment accounts in his name. (R at 1451, pg. 44:20 - 45:19.) In written wiring
instructions to Fidelity Investments, Rappleye and Hodges noted that they desired to
redeem the entire balances in their individual, separate accounts and specifically stated
"we are buying a resort and want the money transferred to close this week." The wiring
instructions, executed by Rappleye and Hodges, indicated that Rappleye's account #417570-736 should have a balance of "$144,000 plus" and that Hodges' account #417-601481 should have a balance of "$153,579.00 plus." (R at 1451, pg. 44:20 - 45:19) (see
Appendix, Exhibit "D").
6.

In February, 1993, Rappleye and Hodges formed a general partnership

under the laws of the State of Missouri that did business as Branson Lake Resort
("Branson Lake Resort"). Rappleye and Hodges each owned a one-half interest in
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Branson Lake Resort. (R at 1451, pg. 44:20 - 45:19, 62:21 - 64:2; R at 1531.) (see
Appendix, Exhibit "E").
7.

On June 15, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled on the parties'

respective appeals and found that remand necessary for further findings on i) the date of
valuation of certain investment accounts; and ii) on the propriety of awarding Plaintiff her
accounting costs. This Court further found that the evidence did not support award of the
entire proceeds from the sale of a certain hardware store to Rappleye. These issues were
remanded to the Fourth District Court to be retried. (R at 270.); See Rappleye v.
Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993).
8.

On July 29, 1993, the Fourth District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah

("Trial Court") scheduled a Pre-Trial Conference to be held on August 23, 1993. (R at
278.) At the Pre-Trail Conference, trial date for the issues on remand was set for
November22, 1993. (Rat 1529;)
9.

Rappleye transferred his ownership in the Branson Property to Hodges by

executing a quit-claim deed on September 17,1993, and filed such deed in the State of
Missouri, Taney County Recorder's Office on September 29, 1993. (R at 1528.) {see
Appendix, Exhibit "F".)
10.

On October 7,1993, Rappleye purportedly transferred real property known

Lot 8, Timpanogos Estates, Wasatch County, located in Midway, Utah ("Timpanogos
Property"), to his son, Robert Shane Rappleye, by quit claim deed. The quit claim deed,
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however, was not signed in the presence of a notary public until October 27, 1993 and not
filed in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office until October 28, 1993. (R at 356-357;
1528.)
11.

On October 18, 1993, just nine (9) days before Rappleye executed the quit

claim deed for the Timpanogos Property in the presence of a notary public transferring
the Timpanogas Property to his son, Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, filed
a Motion for Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment for any non-exempt real property and
personal property. (R at 284.)
12.

On October 28, 1993, twenty-one (21) days after Rappleye purportedly

transferred the Timpanogos Property to his son, and one (1) day after the quit claim deed
for the Timpanogos Property was signed in the presence of a Notary Public, Rappleye, by
and through his counsel of record, submitted an Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Prejudgment Attachment ("Objection") and Affidavit of Rappleye. (R at 306.)
13.

Rappleye's Objection contained the following allegations:

During the appeal herein, Mr. Rappleye remarried and had to move to Missouri to
seek employment to maintain himself and his new family. In Missouri, Mr.
Rappleye is currently employed on an hourly basis which grosses less than
$1,000.00 per month and which provides significantly reduced hours during the
winter months. In order to adequately support himself and his family, Mr.
Rappleye has planned on and anticipated the necessity of the $18,000.00 property
payment to cover his living expenses and debts throughout the winter. Any court
order delaying or depriving Mr. Rappleye of this payment, even for a short period,
will work a grave hardship upon him in his present financial and employment
circumstances.
(R at 304.)
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14.

On October 28, 1993, Rappleye submitted an Affidavit in support of the

Objection, subscribed and sworn to one (1) day before he executed the Quit Claim Deed
in the presence of a notary public, in which he testified:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

I am the defendant in this action and have personal knowledge of the facts
herein.
I am owed a balloon payment of $18,000.00 on November 1, 1993, for the
sale of my property located in Heber City, Utah.
I need this money to pay off my debts and support myself.
I have a $4,000 stock loss debt.
I have a $6,000 legal fee debt (and rising).
I pay $350.00 per month to support my son on his LDS Church mission, of
which I have no income or savings, or convertible assets to meet this
obligation.
I currently reside in a resort community in Missouri where I do maintenance
type work in lieu of my housing expense.
I have no other employment at the present time.
We are presently in the off-season, which results in non-existent job
opportunities.
Without the $ 18,000.00 lump payment owed to me, I will be unable to
provide for myself and unable to meet my financial obligations for the
immediate and foreseeable future.

(Emphasis added). (R at 288 - 289.)
15.

Rappleye concealed from the Trial Court and Plaintiff that he had

moved to Branson, Missouri, with the express purpose of purchasing the Branson
Property with his wife, Hodges, in February, 1993, with $330,000.00 cash, and that he
had transferred his interest therein to Hodges, a mere thirty-nine (39) days prior to
submission of the Objection and Affidavit, without receiving any consideration. (R at
288 - 289; 304.)
16.

After submitting the Objection and Affidavit in the Trial Court on October
8

28, 1993, Rappleye continued to conceal from the Trial Court and Plaintiff his ownership
interest in the Branson Property and Branson Lake Resort. For example, Stephen
Henroid, his counsel of record, represented to the Trial Court on October 29, 1993, in the
Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment proceeding, that Rappleye had $250,000.00 in
securities accounts at the time of the original trial in 1991 and that he had subsequently
lost all of that $250,000.00 on the stock market, and was working for $5.00 per hour to
survive. (R at 258, pg. 8 - 9.)
17.

On October 29, 1993, the Trial Court entered a Prejudgment Writ of

Attachment after a hearing was held on the matter. During the hearing, Rappleye5s
counsel, Stephen Henroid, informed the Court that he had just learned earlier in the day
that Rappleye had apparently transferred the Timpanogas Property to another person.
Due to the transfer, both parties' counsel requested a continuance of the trial date of
November 22, 1993, so the facts surrounding the transfer of the Timpanogas Property
could be discovered. A new trial date, March 23, 1994, was set. (R at 258, pg. 10, 16 17; Rat310; Rat410.)
18.

Also, on October 29, 1993, the same day the Prejudgment Writ of

Attachment was entered, Rappleye and Hodges filed for divorce in the Taney County
Court, State of Missouri. (R at 1451, pg. 58:24 - 59:15; R at 1525).
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19.

On November 30,1993, approximately one (1) month after they filed for

divorce in Taney County, State of Missouri, Rappleye and Hodges were sealed for time
and all eternity in ceremony held in a temple of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, located in Dallas, Texas ("LDS Dallas Temple"). (R at 1451, pg. 58:24 - 59:15; R
at 1525.)
20.

On or around December 3, 1993, just three (3) days after being sealed in

the LDS Dallas Temple, Rappleye and Hodges, representing themselves pro se, entered
into and filed in the Circuit Court of Taney County, State of Missouri, a Marital
Settlement and Separation Agreement. (R at 1451, pg. 58:24 - 59:15; R at 1525).
21.

In the Marital Settlement and Separation Agreement executed and filed

on December 3, 1993, Rappleye and Hodges claimed that they had not acquired any
property during the course of their marriage despite the fact that they had purchased the
Branson Property as a married couple on January 4, 1993, and had formed the general
partnership known as Branson Lake Resort. (R at 1524; R at 1536 at Exhibit "5".)
22.

Rappleye and Hodges also claimed in the Marital Settlement and

Separation Agreement that Rappleye had a premarital worth of only $506.00. (R at 1536
at Exhibit "5".)
23.

On December 23, 1993, Hodges, under the name "Linda Jean Rappleye",

transferred the Branson Property to herself, as "Linda Hodges" by a Warranty Deed. (R at
1536, at Exhibit "7") (see Appendix, Exhibit "G").
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24.

On or around January 6,1994, Hodges' and Rappleye's Decree of

Dissolution of Marriage was entered in Taney County, Missouri. (R at 1536, at Exhibit
"6".)
25.

After the trial on remand held on March 23, 1994, the Trial Court awarded

Plaintiff a judgment against Rappleye, as part of the Decree and Judgment ("Decree and
Judgment"), in the amount of $216,011.47. As part of the Judgment of $216,011.47,
entered on October 19,1994, Plaintiff was awarded one-half of the value of a certain
Timberline Hardware Store owned by the parties during their marriage. The Trial Court
found the value of tjie Timberline Hardware Store to be $364,877.95 and that Plaintiffs
resulting interest would be $182,438.97. The Timberline Hardware Store was sold in
1988 and Rappleye had exclusive control over all the proceeds of the sale at all times. (R
at 706-710.)
26.

At the trial on remand on March 23, 1994, Rappleye testified that he

spent part of the proceeds from the sale of the Timberline Hardware store on debts and
obligations from his marriage to Plaintiff and that he lost the remainder of the proceeds
on the stock market. Rappleye testified under oath that he had lost in excess of
$200,000.00 in the stock market in 1992 and 1993 and that he had no assets other than the
Timpanogos Property. (R at 1536, at Exhibit "C" at pages 51-55.)
27.

As part of the Decree and Judgment, the Trial Court also set aside and
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voided Rappleye's concealed transfer of the Timpanogos Property to his son and
specifically found that the transfer had been undertaken with the express intent to defraud
Plaintiff (Rat 706-710.)
28.

On May 4, 1994, Rappleye signed and submitted to the Fourth District

Court his Objections to the Plaintiffs [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law ("Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"). Rappleye
claimed in the Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that he
had lost $242,000.00 in stock market losses. (R at 1451, p. 66 - 67; R at 1536, at Exhibit
"37".)
29.

On October 11, 1994, Rappleye signed and submitted to the Fourth

District Court a Letter of Objection to Plaintiffs Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
and Decree and Judgment ("Letter of Objection"). Rappleye stated in the Letter of
Objection that he had been "devastated by $237,000,000 in investment losses in 1992 and
1993 .. , There are NO remaining assets for collectable judgment". (Emphasis in
original). (R at 601 - 614; 1451, pg. 68:4 - 69:9.)
30.

On February 10, 1995, four (4) months after entry of the Decree and

Judgment, Rappleye filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in United States
Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Missouri, Southern Division ("Bankruptcy
Court"). (R at 1451, pg. 85:8-19; R at 1536, at Exhibit "40".)
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31.

In the Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs also submitted to

the Bankruptcy Court on February 10, 1995, and signed by Rappleye under penalty of
perjury, Rappleye claimed assets in the amount of $356.17 consisting entirely of exempt
personal property. (R at 1451, pg. 84: 12-17; R at 1536, at Exhibit "40".)
32.

In the Statement of Financial Affairs, Rappleye claimed under penalty

of perjury that he had incurred stock losses for 1992 in the amount of $78,752.00 and
1993 in the amount of $150,131.00, for a total of $228,884. (R at 1451, pg. 91-92; R at
1536, at Exhibit "40").
33.

After transferring his interest in the Branson Property to Hodges on

September 17, 1993, Rappleye continued to reside on the property and his living expenses
were covered by Hodges. (R at 287 - 289; R at 1451, pg. 137 - 138.)
34.

On May 10, 1995, Hodges sold the Branson Property under the name of

"Linda Hodges" to Emery Smith for approximately $440,000.00. (R at 1521; R 1536, at
Exhibit "F",pg. 20-21.)
35.

In or around May, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Bankruptcy

Court to determine the Dischargeability of the Debt. (R at 1521.)
36.

On February 1, 1996, at the trial held on Plaintiffs Complaint to

Determine Dischargeability, Rappleye again testified under oath that he had lost all his
assets on the stock market. (R at 1451, pg. 97 - 102:12.)
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37.

The Bankruptcy Court, after conducting a two-day trial, issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Opinion ("Opinion") on May
28, 1997. The Bankruptcy Court determined that Plaintiffs claim was non-dischargeable.
(R at 1521, at Exhibit "41"; See Appendix, Exhibit "H".)
38.

In the Opinion, the Bankruptcy Court, while ruling that the debt could

not be discharged, seriously called into question Rappleye's credibility by reciting past
incidents of commercial fraud, forgery, and the fraudulent transfer of real estate. In the
Opinion, the Bankruptcy court further noted regarding Rappleye's testimony at trial that
"he simply refused to believe judges have the right to distribute any of his assets to
Johnson [Plaintiff] because he knew that they were his own pre-marital property.
Rappleye claimed to be right and the judges were wrong. In effect, Rappleye claims to be
above the law and again it is consistent with some of his other actions such as conveying
assets." (R at 1521, at Exhibit "41"; See Appendix, Exhibit "H".)
39.

The Bankruptcy Court specifically found that Rappleye kept trying to

take away Plaintiff s judgment, "whether by court proceeding or by simply dissipating the
assets" and noted his position as being that "he is not going to be bound by any judge's
determination." (R at 1521, at Exhibit "41"; See Appendix, Exhibit "H".)
40.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court found as follows:

Rappleye had a state of mind that was not good. He has some credibility
problems. But to try and go back and give him the benefit of the doubt, the court
notes that often defendants may very sincerely and subjectively believe that they
are correct, and it is extremely difficult to accept an adverse judgment. Rappleye
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certainly has a strong subjective belief that so far all of the four, five or six judges
who have looked at the case must be wrong because they do not agree with him.
All of the trial judges in Utah, the appellate judges or even an appellate panel, all
agree in finding against Rappleye. At some point, Rappleye must realize that,
especially where he has sought the services and protection of the court, that he is
bound by the judgment.
(R at 1521, at Exhibit "41"; See Appendix, Exhibit "H".)
41.

Throughout the trial on remand and the bankruptcy proceedings, Hodges

and Rappleye resided together, concealed their divorce from their family, friends, church,
employers and represented themselves to the IRS as a married couple despite the fact that
they were divorced on January 6, 1994. (R at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19.)
42.

On May 21, 1997, Hodges purchased real property and a residence located

at 1015 South River Road #31, St. George, Utah ("St. George Property") Utah, for
$94,000.00.
43.

In or around June, 1998, Hodges and Rappleye met with attorney Kurt

A. Johnson ("Johnson") to discuss a separate property trust, will, durable power of
attorney and medical power of attorney in order to, among other things, protect the
proceeds from the sale of the Branson Property from execution by Plaintiff. (R at 1451,
pg. 136:7-15.)
44.

On June 15, 1998, Hodges executed the following documents prepared by

Johnson: The Linda Jean Hodges Separate Property Trust ("Trust"); Last Will and
Testament ("Will"); Springing Durable Power of Attorney ("SDPOA"); and a Durable
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Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions ("DPOAHCD"). (Rat 1451,pg. 104:11 106:19; R at 1536, at Exhibit "14" - "18".)
45.

Rappleye is listed as the primary beneficiary and the successor trustee of

the Trust, which has the effect of giving him unfettered access to the trust estate since he
is the primary beneficiary of the Trust upon the death of Hodges and no accounting is
required to be made to the secondary beneficiaries, Rappleye's and Hodges' children. (R
at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19; R at 1536, at Exhibit "14" - "18".)
In her Will, Hodges appointed Rappleye as her executor. Likewise, in her SDPOA,
Hodges appointed Rappleye as the attorney/agent in fact to manage all her assets in the
event of her incapacity. (R at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19; R at 1536, at Exhibit "14" "18".)
46-

Rappleye is currently living with Hodges in St. George, Utah in a residence

purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the Branson Property, but titled under
Hodges' name, and has lived there since May, 1997, the date the property was purchased,
without payment of rent or other consideration. (R at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19.)
47.

After purchasing the St. George Property in 1997, Rappleye and Hodges

continued to hold themselves out as a married couple to, or concealed their divorce from,
their families, friends, employers, IRS and their church. (R at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19.)
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48.

Rappleye and Hodges, however, were not legally and lawfully married

from the date of their divorce on January 6, 1994, until September 12,2001, just days
after they returned to the State of Utah from selling the motor vehicles in Las Vegas,
Veada, when they were questioned about their marital status by the Bishop of their ward
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (R at 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19.)
Rappleye and Hodges were remarried in Mesquite, Nevada, on September 12, 2001 at the
counsel of their Bishop. (Rat 1451, pg. 104:11 - 106:19,)
49.

Due to Rappleye's consistent and continual concealment and non-

disclosure to Plaintiff and the courts of his assets and business activities, Plaintiff did not
know about the existence of Rappleye and Hodges' general partnership's named Branson
Lake Resort, or that Rappleye had purchased the Branson Property until April, 2001. (R
at 1451, pg. 141.)
50.

Plaintiff also did not know of the existence of significant assets under

the name of Linda Jean Hodges, individually, or the Linda Jean Hodges Separate Property
Trust, as Trustee, until April, 2001, when she learned in April that the residence in which
Rappleye and Hodges were residing was titled under Hodges' name, as Trustee for the
Separate Property Trust, and on September 26,2001, when her counsel of record learned
during a supplemental proceeding that Hodges had a Fidelity Investment account with a
balance of more than $300,000.00. (Rat 1451, pg. 141: Rat 1511.)
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51.

After unsuccessful attempts to serve Rappleye and Hodges at their

residence in St. George, Utah in June and July, 2001, with the Motion and Order in
Supplemental Proceedings, Rappleye and Hodges were located at the Star Valley Resort,
in Star Valley, Wyoming ("Resort").
52.

Also on or around July 3, 2001, after learning that someone was trying

to serve them with papers, Rappleye called the Fourth District Court to inquire about what
legal action was being taken by Plaintiff and at that time learned about the Motion and
Order for Supplemental Proceedings. (R at 1451, pg. 23:8-18, 122:7 - 20.)
53.

On July 3, 2001, Rappleye and Hodges left Star Valley, Wyoming, and

eventually ended up in Las Vegas, Nevada. Rappleye and Hodges had in their possession
on July 5,2001, a 1985 Fleetwood Pac Motor Home ("Motor Home"), and a 1994 Suzuki
Sidekick ("Sidekick"). At the time, Rappleye was listed as the owner of the Motor Home
and the Sidekick on their Utah Certificates of Title. (R at 1451, pg. 28:8-18,122:7 - 20.)
54.

On July 9, 2001, a Writ of Execution covering all of the non-exempt

property of Rappleye was issued by the Fourth District Court, in connection with the
Decree and Judgment. (R. at 813 - 816.)
55.

On July 11, 2001, Rappleye transferred the titles to Motor Home and

Sidekick from Utah Certificates of Title showing him as the owner to Idaho Certificates
of Title showing him as the owner, but listed his residential address as 510 East 17th
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Street, #308, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404, the address of a Mail Boxes, Etc. Rappleye and
Hodges have never resided in the State of Idaho. (R at 1451, pg. 28:1-14, 121:7-25.)
56.

On August 24, 2001, the Trial Court issued an Order to Shov Cause

ordering Rappleye to appear on September 26,2001, to show cause why a x..ench Warrant
should not be entered against Rappleye for his earlier failure to appear at a Motion and
Supplemental Order Proceeding hearing, and an Order Granting Ex-Parte Motion for
Service of Order to Show Cause by Mailing and the Court mailed the Order to Show
cause to Rappleye at his last known addresses. (R 757 - 762.)
57.

On August 30, 2001, just days after receipt of the Order to Show Cause,

Rappleye sold the Motor Home and the Sidekick to Cars 4 U, a motor vehicle dealership
located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The proceeds of the sale were placed under the name of
Hodges. (R. at 1451, p. 28-31.)
58.

On October 26, 2001, a second Writ of Execution covering all of the non-

exempt property of Rappleye, including Fidelity Investment Accounts #X29-106640,
#X33-089737, #Y01-058866, and #X29-179590 ("Fidelity Investment Accounts"), was issued by
the Trial Court. (R. at 897 - 903.)
59.

Hodges admits that the money in Fidelity Investment Accounts upon which

execution was levied in this case, as well as the money used to purchase the St. George
Property, is from the proceeds of the sale of the Branson Property. (R. at 1451, p. 12-13).
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60.

On April 29,2002, the Trial Court entered a Memorandum Decision and,

on January 8,2003, entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order of
Execution. (R at 1393 - 1430.)
61.

The Order of Execution confirmed that Plaintiff was entitled to execute

upon the Fidelity Investment Accounts and the proceeds of the sale of Motor Home and
the Suzuki Sidekick. (R at 1429).
62.

On January 27, 2003, the Trial Court entered an Order, based on the

Stipulation of the parties, supersedeas bond in connection with this appeal in the amount
of $230,000.00. The parties had stipulated, and the Trial Court ordered, that the
$212,916.00 be considered as Rappleye's 48.49 percent interest in the proceeds of the
Branson Property. The stipulation was reached, in part, to avoid the necessity of
commencing another execution proceeding in Wasatch County on subject of the St.
George Property. (R at 1435 - 1444) (see Appendix "I ".)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in ruling that the concealment
prong of the common law discovery rule applies in this case. The application of the legal
rule of fraudulent concealment to the circumstances in this case is left to the Trial Court
under Utah law. Rappleye's claim that Plaintiff had actual, constructive or implied notice
of the transfer of his interest in the Branson Property to Hodges in September, 1993, is
without merit. Rappleye consistently denied under oath having any assets, and during his
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bankruptcy trial, expressly denied ever having any financial or record interest in the
Branson Property. Also, Utah courts have ruled that the recordation of a deed does not
apprise a party of the fraudulent nature of a transfer.
The Trial Court found that Plaintiff established an overwhelming primae facie case
of fraudulent transfer, that Plaintiff could not have known about her claim for fraudulent
concealment until April, 2001, and that Plaintiff acted reasonably and with due diligence
at all times. Rappleye has not marshaled any evidence to show that these findings were
against the clear weight of the evidence.
Even if this Court were to conclude that the Trial Court erroneously applied the
concealment prong of the discovery rule, it constitutes harmless error as the Trial Courts
entered findings of fact which meet the elements of statutory discovery rule contained in
the UFTA. The Trial Court specifically found that Plaintiff could not have known about
the fraudulent transfer until April, 2001.
Rappleye failed to properly brief the issues of whether the Trial Court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate the fraudulent transfer and full faith and credit issues raised in
his Brief. Rappleye failed to cite to any legal authority. More importantly, the authority
cited herein shows that Rappleye's jurisdictional claims are without merit.
Hodges attended and materially participated in the execution proceedings. In fact,
Hodges filed a Request of Hearing claiming that the Fidelity Investment Accounts did not
contain any of Rappleye's property. Mr. Quesenberry represented the interests of Hodges
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in the Trial Court, as well as another case between the parties filed in the Provo
Department of the Fourth District Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DISCOVERY
RULE TOLLED THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that the discovery rule tolled the applicable statutes

of limitations on Plaintiffs claims.
Generally, a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary
to complete the cause of action. However, in certain instances, the discovery rule
may operate to toll the period of limitations until discovery of the facts forming the
basis for the cause of action.
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50-51 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted) (internal
punctuation altered).
Under the "discovery rule/' statutes of limitations may be tolled until discovery of
facts forming the basis for a cause of action (1) in situations where the discovery rule is
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the
cause of action due to the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the
general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant
has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 753
(Utah 2002) (citations omitted); see also Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51.
a.

The Concealment Prong of the Discovery Rule Applies to Plaintiffs
Claim of Fraudulent Transfer.
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Under Utah law, whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies to a specific
set of facts is a question of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Aurora
Credit Serv. v. Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah l99S)(citingBerenda v.
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996) ("The application of this rule to any particular set
of facts is necessarily a matter left to trial courts and finders of fact.")); Jensen v. IHC
Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 334 (Utah 1997).
In Berenda, the court noted that normally all that is required to trigger the statute
of limitations is sufficient information to apprise a plaintiff of the underlying cause of
action so as to put them on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or
questions about a defendant's actions; but the court noted an exception:
[Ujnder our case law the rule is otherwise when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant
took affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiffs cause of action, as is the case here.
In such a situation, the plaintiff can avoid the full operation of the discovery rule
by making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not
have discovered the claim earlier.
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51; See also Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130
(Utah 1992) (balancing reasonableness of plaintiff s diligence in discovering claim
against defendant's acts of concealment); Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107
(Utah 1978) (finding that reasonable reliance on defendant's misrepresentations tolled
statute of limitations until discovery of cause of damage.)
The Berenda court noted continued:
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Thus, the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule aims to navigate a
balance between two competing policies: (i) that which underlies all statutes of
limitations, namely, 'to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared, and (ii) that of not allowing
a defendant who has concealed his wrongdoing to profit from his concealment. To
the extent that the rule requires examination of the reasonableness of a plaintiffs
conduct in light of the defendant's actions, it differs from the rule as applied when
no fraudulent concealment is alleged.
Id. at 52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).1
The following standard has been adopted to determine the applicability of the
concealment prong of the discovery rule:
At its most basic level, the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule
requires a determination of (i) when a plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to
inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing despite the defendant's efforts to conceal it;
and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, would reasonably have, with due
diligence, discovered the facts forming the basis of the cause of action despite the
efforts to conceal those facts.
Id. at 52.
Recently, in Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Utah 2001), and Aurora Credit
Service v. Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273,1278 (Utah 1998), the Supreme Court of Utah
made it clear that weighing the reasonableness of a plaintiffs conduct in light of the
1

Aurora Credit Serv. v. Liberty West, 970 P.2d 1273,1278 (Utah
1998) ("The fraudulent concealment doctrine originated as an equitable doctrine to
estop one who has prevented discovery of a cause of action by wrongfully
concealing a material fact from asserting a statute of limitations defense to the
assertion of the claim." (Citations omitted). "This court has applied this doctrine
in the statute of limitations context to estop a wrongdoer from benefitting from
concealing his wrong.")
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defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action necessitates factual findings and,
therefore, is in the providence of the fact finder.
In this case, the Trial Court ruled that Plaintiff overwhelmingly established a
prima facie case of fraudulent concealment, that Plaintiff would not have reasonably been
on notice to inquire into Rappleye's wrongdoing until April, 2001, and that Plaintiff acted
reasonably and exercised due diligence at all times. (R at 1003,1005, 1009; 1397, 1399,
1401-1402.)
Rappleye attempts to avoid the overwhelming evidence in support of application of
the concealment prong of the discovery rule by arguing that Plaintiff knew or could have
known of his ownership of the Branson Property because the conveyancing deeds at issue
were recorded in his own name. In support of this argument, Rappleye relies on Baldwin
v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) (Creditors would have discovered the
conveyance had they conducted a normal search of property upon which to levy when
they received their judgment against debtor).
In Baldwin, however, the plaintiff did not allege, let alone show, that the defendant
had somehow concealed the cause of action. The Supreme Court of Utah stated that
"[Recording a deed or entering judgment alone is not enough in some circumstances to
apprise a party of the fraudulent nature of a conveyance." Id. at 1195 (noting Smith v.
Edwards, 17 P.2d 264, 271 (Utah 1932)("Mere constructive knowledge of the deed by
reason of its having been filed for record is not notice of the facts constituting the fraud.")
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Moreover, this Court recently held that "the concealment prong of the discovery rule
applies to toll the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs claim, regardless of inquiry or
constructive notice." Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616, 621 (Utah Ct.
App. 2003) (citation omitted).
Utah courts have consistently held that there is a vast difference between
"situations where there [are] no allegations that defendant engaged in acts of concealment
[citations omitted], and those in which 'a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took
affirmative steps to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action.'" Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271,
1276 (Utah 2001). In fact, the Hill court called the "alleged concealment critical to the
statute of limitations question." Id. (Emphasis added).
Rappleye's position completely ignores his misleading acts, many of which were
done while he was under oath and penalty of perjury, and continued concealment of his
title and financial interest in the Branson Property. Indeed, notwithstanding the
indisputable evidence that he transferred at least $144,000.00 from his Fidelity
Investment Account for the specific and stated purpose of purchasing the Branson
Property, Rappleye continues to deny under oath ever having any financial interest
therein.
In Berenda, the Supreme Court of Utah found "Langford's [defendant] reliance on
United Park City Mines and Baldwin unhelpful because those cases did not involve a
defendant's affirmative fraudulent concealment of the plaintiffs cause of action."
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Berenda, 914 P.2d at 52. The Berenda Court stated that, simply put, Baldwin did not
require us "to judge the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light of the
defendant's acts of concealment." Id. Likewise, in Russell/Packard, this Court noted the
error in the defendant's reliance on discovery cases not involving allegations of
fraudulent concealment for the same reason. Russell/Packard, 78P.3dat621. For this
reason, Baldwin and other non-concealment cases are unhelpful in the instant case.
Rappleye also seeks to avoid application of the discovery rule by noting an
exchange between Rappleye and Plaintiffs counsel at the bankruptcy trial in February of
1996. He speculates that Plaintiffs counsel knew about the deeds at issue. A review of
the exchange, however, reveals only that Plaintiffs attorney knew the name of the person
who sold the Branson Property to Hodges and the person to whom Hodges later sold. The
exchange in no way reveals how, or from whom, Plaintiffs attorney learned that
information.
It is illogical to conclude from a review of the entire exchange, and there is no
evidence in the exchange, that Plaintiffs counsel knew that i) Rappleye purchased the
Branson Property with Hodges; ii) that Rappleye had held title in the Branson Property
jointly with Hodges; and/or iii) that Rappleye transferred his interest in the Branson
Property to Hodges on September 17,1993. If Plaintiff s counsel had this information, it
could have used it to Plaintiffs great advantage during the bankruptcy trial.
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Moreover, Rappleye continued his pattern of fraud and deceit in the same
exchange by denying under oath ever having invested in, or ever having any interest in,
the Branson Property:
Checkett Bryce Checkett Bryce Checkett Bryce Checkett Bryce Checkett Bryce -

Did you have any interest in the resort?
I didn't have any interest in the resort.
Your testimony is that you had no interest in it at all?
None.
No money in it?
No money in it.
Jean wasn't holding anything for you?
Jean?
Yes, sir?
No.2

(R at 1451, pg. 36:19 -38:17.)
The Trial Court noted that Rappleye failed to introduce any evidence that Plaintiff
knew of Rappleye's interest in this Branson Property and that it was "disingenuous to
argue that Plaintiff should have continued to exercise due diligence in attempting to
discover the facts surrounding the transfer in spite of his strong denial under oath."
(Rat 1006.)
b.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Concealment Prong of the
Discovery Rule Applies to Plaintiffs Claim for Fraudulent Transfer in
Addition to the Statutory Discovery Rule Contained in the Utah
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act

2

This is a blatant example of Rappleye's failure to marshal the
evidence upon which the Trail Court relied, as discussed more fully in Section III
below. Although he attached an informal transcript of the exchange in his
Appendix, as Exhibit "D", Rappleye did not include this important part of the
exchange in his Brief.
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Rappleye argues that the common law discovery rule does not apply in this matter
since the Utah Uniform Transfer Act ("UFTA") includes its own discovery rule. This
argument is without merit. The Trial Court correctly ruled that Rappleye's position is
contrary to well-established Utah law that the concealment prong of the discovery rule
may be applied in addition to a statutory discovery rule.
Under the UTFA, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1), a claim for relief or cause of
action regarding a fraudulent transfer or obligation is extinguished unless action is
brought:
(1)

under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years after the transfer was made
or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer
or obligation was or could have been reasonably have been discovered by
the claimant.

Rappleye erroneously relies on two cases to advance his assertion that an explicit
statutory discovery rule alone governs this matter, namely: Aragon v. Clover Club Foods
Co., 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), and Selvage v. J J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d
1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
In Aragon, this Court noted that "the legislature has statutorily incorporated
discovery rules in several statutes of limitation. Other discovery rules have been adopted
by judicial action . . . . " Aragon, 857 P.2d at 252.3 Even though the Aragon court applied

3

Utah courts have long held that "under the concealment prong [of the
discovery rule], a defendant who misleads the plaintiff is, in essence, estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the claim." Anderson v.
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the discovery rule explicitly contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3, it did not hold that
the common law discovery rule cannot be, or should not be, applied in cases where there
is an explicit statutory discovery rule. In fact, 'mAragon, unlike the present case, there
was no allegation or showing of misleading conduct or fraudulent concealment of the
cause of action. There was also no allegation or showing of technical knowledge
necessary for employment of the exceptional circumstances prong of the common law
discovery rule. Thus, there was no reason for the court mAragon to apply the common
law discovery rule.
In Selvage, an opinion issued three (3) years after Aragon, this Court rejected an
argument identical to Rappleye's in Connection with a UFTA claim:
[Cross-Appellant] argues that even if the time limit in 25-6-10(3) is a statute of
limitation, the [common law] discovery rule still does not apply. [Cross-Appellant]
argues that because section 25-6-10(1) contains an explicit discovery rule, and the
other two sections of the time limits section do not, the legislature implicitly meant
to preclude the application of the discovery rule to claims brought under
subsections (2) or (3). However, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Klinger v.
Kightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990), a statutory discovery rule is only one rationale
for invoking the discovery rule. The discovery rules applies in situations where
'there is proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant' or where
'application of the general statute of limitations would be irrational or unjust.'
Selvage, 910 P.2d at 1259 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
In Berenda, a case to which Rappleye frequently cites in his Brief, the Supreme
Court of Utah applied the fraudulent concealment prong of the discovery rule to

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992).
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determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled even though Utah Code Ann. § 7812-27 (the statute of limitations at issue therein) contains an explicit discovery rule.
By its express terms, the statute mandates that we apply the discovery rule. In
addition, the Amtec plaintiffs presented a prima facie case that Langford
[defendant] fraudulently concealed their cause of action. It is the application of
the discovery rule in the context of a defendant's fraudulent concealment that is at
issue in the instant case.
Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51 (emphasis added).
In summary, the Trial Court's ruling on the application of the fraudulent
concealment prong of the discovery rule was correct for precisely the reason the cases
upon which Rappleye relies are unhelpful: Plaintiff alleged, and proved overwhelmingly,
that Rappleye affirmatively concealed her cause of action for fraudulent transfer.
c.

Plaintiffs Constructive Trust Claim is Also Subject to the Discovery
Rule.

The Trial Court did not rule on Plaintiffs claim for constructive trust, presumably
because it was not necessary due to its determination that Rappleye's conveyance of the
Branson Property was fraudulent. This Court, however, has the authority to affirm the
Trial Court's decision on proper grounds other than those which the Trial Court cited in
making its decision. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451,
456 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Buehner Block Co. v. UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95
(Utah 1998).
This Court recently defined a constructive trust as follows:
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A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in the
absence of any express or implied intention to form a trust.. . [A] constructive
trust may arise 'where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it . . .'
Nielson v. Nielson, 2000 WL 332493999 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (Citations omitted).
Constructive trusts have also been defined as follows:
A constructive trust-sometimes referred to as a legal fiction or a fiction of equity,
and sometimes referred to as a 'trust ex maleficio', based on the view that fraud,
either actual or constructive is the very foundation of such trusts - is not a technical
trust, but an implied trust. Unlike an express trust, it is not created, but arises by
operation and implication of the law, or, more accurately, by construction of the
court, when equity so demands. A constructive trust is imposed when one has
acquired legal title to property under such circumstances that he or she may not in
good conscience retain the beneficial interest thereto. It is an equitable remedy
imposed for the recovery of wrongfully held property, to compel a person who
unfairly holds a property interest to hold property in trust for the person to whom
in equity and good conscience it should be held or enjoyed, to convey it to the
rightful owner, or to set aside a property transfer when property has been acquired
under certain inequitable circumstances. It is raised by equity to satisfy the
demands of justice to redress a wrong, or to prevent or avoid an unjust enrichment
of one party at the expense of another as the result of a transfer of either real or
personal property.
76 Am. Jur 2d, Trusts § 200 (1992)(citations omitted).
In the present case, Rappleye transferred the Branson Property to Hodges at a time
when Plaintiff had a claim against him. Rappleye continued to enjoy and control the
benefits of the Branson Property by managing the property and residing there after the
transfer. (R at 1414.) Rappleye has also enjoyed, and will continue to enjoy, the benefit
of the proceeds of the sale of the Branson Property by Hodges to a third-party by i)
residing at the St. George Property, which was purchased with the proceeds of the sale of
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the Branson Property, without payment of rent or other consideration; ii) having Hodges
pay for his other living expenses; and iii) having a durable power of attorney over, and
being the primary beneficiary of, Hodges' estate. (R at 1412-1413, 1411.)
The Trial Court's findings of fact establish the legal fictions created by the transfer
of Rappleye's interest in the Branson Property to Hodges, and the placement of the
proceeds from the sale thereof in the name of Hodges. Accordingly, this Court has the
authority to affirm the Trial Court's order of execution of the assets attributed to Hodges'
under the constructive trust doctrine.
In Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 WL 332493999, *4 (Utah App. 2000), after noting that
the discovery rule applies to constructive trusts, this Court held that the four year statute
of limitations was tolled under the discovery rule until the plaintiff, Ms. Nielson,
discovered the fact that her ex-husband, Mr. Nielson, had placed his interest in their
residence under the name of his brother.
Ms. Nielson did not file her lawsuit until March, 1995, almost nine (9) years after
the conveyancing deed at issue was recorded. Mr. Nielson had transferred his title in the
residence to his brother in 1986. Despite being a tenant in common with Mr. Nielson,
Ms. Nielson did not discover the transfer until May 15,1991, approximately five (5) years
after the deed was recorded. She first discovered the transfer when applying for a loan.
She then waited more than three (3) years to commence legal action. Id.
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In Nielson, Ms. Nielson resided at the real property at issue. Nevertheless, this
Court noted that Baldwin held that although a deed is recorded, limitations period does
not commence until claimant should have acquired knowledge that transfer was
fraudulent. Id. (citing Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1195-1197). This Court refused to find that
Ms. Nielson knew or should have known of the transfer on the date the deed was
recorded.
Although the records shows Laree [plaintiff] may have had constructive notice of
the deed when it was recorded, defendants have failed to marshal any evidence that
she had actual or constructive notice of the facts which would justify imposing the
constructive trust before May 15, 1991.
Id.
Rappleye, like Mr. Nielson, failed to introduce any evidence in front of the Trial
Court that Plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of the facts justifying imposition
of a constructive trust prior to April, 2001. As a result, imposition of a constructive trust
would have also been appropriate grounds for entry of the Order of Execution.
II

ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THE COMMON LAW DISCOVERY
RULE BY THE TRIAL COURT WOULD CONSTITUTE HARMLESS
ERROR IN THIS CASE.
Rappleye implies in his Brief, but never directly alleges, that the Trial Court

committed reversible error in applying the concealment prong of the discovery rule to toll
the applicable statute of limitations. Under Utah law, an "error" that does not affect
substantial rights of the parties is not a reversible error, but a harmless error. See Utah R.
C. P. 61; see also State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Rappleye bears "the
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burden of showing not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and
prejudicial." SeeAshton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987).
To demonstrate prejudice, Rappleye must show a reasonable likelihood that
without the application of the concealment prong of the discovery rule - the error implied
in this case - there would have been a different result. See Tingey v. Christensen, 987
P.2d 588, 592 (Utah 1999). This likelihood must be sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome of the Trial Court's decision. See Id.; State v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 902
(Utah Q . App. 1996).
In the present case, Rappleye has failed to show reversible error. Rappleye asserts
that the UFTA's built-in discovery rule, as follows, should have been applied in this case:
under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), within four years after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation
was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10(1).
The Trial Court specifically found that Plaintiff was not on notice of the fraudulent
transfer, and that she could not have discovered the facts forming the basis for her cause
of action, until April, 2001. (R at 1003, 1005, 1397, 1400.) The Trial Court further
found that Plaintiff exercised due diligence and acted reasonably at all times. (R at 1397,
1399 - 1400.)
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Rappleye could not be prejudiced by any error in the application of the common
law discovery rule because the result would have been the same had the Trial Court
applied the findings of fact to the statutory discovery rule contained in the I) F"IA
III

THE CO URT OF APPEALS MUST CONSIDER THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT TO BE PROPER AS RAPPLEYE FAILED TO
REQUEST THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDING OR TO
PROPERLY MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
Rappleye failed to request the transcript of the entire proceeding in the I "ii; n 1 Court

review.
a.

Rappleye Failed to Request the Transcript for the Entire Proceeding.

Rappleye only requested the transcript for the hearing held in this matter on March
6,2002 (U if I l<Jo i \ii initial » \n\a\lh\t\ h\>m\\y lonk f.»Lu miDuimlvi I ,"\ '001. (R
at 891-892.) In the December 12, 2001 hearing, Plaintiffs counsel, upon stipulation of
the parties, proffered the entire fact section and time-line contained in Plaintiffs Hearing
Brief for Motion for Contempt, Applicat ion, andW i it of Execi ition and discussed in
detn

' Exhibits attached thereto. (R at 891-892; R 1503-1536 and Exhibits A-L & 1-

44 attached thereto.)
Under Rule 11 of the T Itah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("UK A I1 ), Rappleye did

necessary. However, if only part of the transcript was requested, Rappleye had the
responsibility to file a statement of the issues to be presented on appeal together with the
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request for transcript, and serve upon Plaintiff a copy thereof. URAP Rule 11(e)(3).
Plaintiff then would have had ten (10) days from service of the statement of issues to file
and serve on Rappleye a designation of any of the portions of the proceedings which he
wished to be included. Id. Rappleye did not file a statement of issues in this case. {See
Record Index.)
If Rappleye intended to challenge a finding or conclusion as unsupported by or
contrary to the evidence, he had the responsibility of requesting the transcript of all
evidence relevant to the finding or conclusion to be challenged. URAP Rule 11(e)(2).
"Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in
providing the relevant portions of the transcript." Id.
As a result of Rappleye5 s failure to provide a complete transcript of the relevant
evidence as mandated by URAP Rule 11(e)(2), this Court is "unable to review the
evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by
admissible evidence." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989) (quoting Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765
(Utah 1985)).
b.

Rappleye Also Failed to Properly Marshal the Evidence.

Rappleye has failed to inform this Court of a significant portion of the evidence
supporting the Trial Court's decision. When challenging a finding of fact, appellate
courts refuse to address the challenge unless the appellant has properly marshaled the

37

evidence. See Child v. Gonda, 912 P.2d - 125, 433-34 (I Jte ill 1998); Win w • v. Labor
Comm'n. 973 P 2i 1 982, 985 (I Jfc ill Ct \pp. 1998). l
Appellate courts must assume the findings of fact are correct unless appellants
properly marshaled all the evidence in support of the challenged findings. See
v.Fitzgerald,

961 Win 3 t o , ^ 1 / ( U a h t ^ % ) ; Johnson

(1 Jtah Ct A pp 1999)

i tliyja

Valcarce

, *»77 P A! 120V, L I*

If the evidence is propei ly marshaled, appellants then must show

that the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the challenged findings when
viewing the evidence and inferences in a lijght most favorable to the decision. Child, 972
.P.2d at <- • *. Johnson,

9 7 1 P 2< I \ it 121 1

In the present case, the Findings of Fact were twenty-six (26) pages in length. (W
at 1394-1426.) The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision was eighteen (18) pages in
length. (R a 1394-1426.) In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court noted that "[i]n

of these facts are controverted b y Rappleyp in subsequent pleadings. T h e court will rely
o n those facts as admitted except as contrary evidence was produced at the hearing."

fJ

at 1 018 ) Each fact contained in Plaintiffs Statement of Facts was supported b y

4

j jie

marshaiing

requirement "provides the appellate court the basis

from which to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the facts challenged
on appeal" and "serves an important function in reminding litigants and appellate
courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial." Robb v. Anderton,
863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) and Woodward i Fazzio,%Ti P.2d 474,
477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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l

evidence, through affidavit, exhibit or otherwise. (R 1503-1536 and Exhibits A-L & 1-44
attached thereto.)
Despite the detailed format of the Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision
showing the undisputed facts upon which the Trial Court relied, Rappleye failed marshal
numerous significant facts that support the Trial Court's findings and conclusions:
i

Facts related to the purchase of the Branson Property.

Rappleye failed to marshal related to the closing of the Branson Property,
including the fact that he executed the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the HUD
Settlement Statement. Rappleye also failed to marshal the fact that he transferred
approximately $144,000.00 in funds from his Fidelity Investment Account on January 4,
1993, the date of closing, with the specifically stated purpose of purchasing the Branson
property. See Statement of the Facts <|ffl 7-10; 16-17.
ii

Facts a out the time line from June 15.1993 to January 6, 1994.

Rappleye failed to marshal the time line from June 15, 1993, the date Rappleye v.
Rappleye was remanded, to January 6, 1994, the date Rappleye's and Hodges' divorce
became final, including but not limited to hearings dates, the original remand trial date,
and the proximately of these dates to the date Rappleye transferred the Branson Property
to Hodges. Rappleye also failed to marshal the evidence that he fraudulently transferred
the Timpanogos Property to his son at this same time and that such transfer was set aside
and void in the Decree and Judgment. See Statement of the Facts Iff 17-23; 46-48.
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iii

Facts related to Rappleye's and Hodges' divorce.

Rappleye failed to marshal the evidence on his and Hodges' divorce, including the
timing of the commencement of the divorce case, the date of their sealing ordinance in the
L DS Dallas ' I emple, and the fact that they continued to live together and hold themsel v es
01 it as married to t! leii neighbors, famil> , and church despite not reman y Ing until
September 12, 2001. See Statement of the Factsffl[11-15; 25-31.
iv

Facts related to Rappleye's sworn testimony and representations to the Trial
Court and the Bankruptcy Court.

•Rappley '.nkd io m ti«-.liil tin n i«l**n^r *>( In** *:wn?n Ir.hinony -iiul

representations, made to the Trial Court and Bankruptcy Court, on the subject of his
alleged losses on the stock market and inability to pay the Judgment amount including his
affidavit, his testimony attl le remai iiifi ial, 1 lis objections aftei the remand ti ial, his
testimony at the bankruptcy trial. See Statement of the Facts ^ff
v

Facts related Rappleye's avoidance of service of Motion and Order in
Supplemental Proceedings and Writ of Execution and sale of Motor Home
and Suzuki Sidekick.

R appleye also failed to i i mrsl ial the e\ idence of 1 lis attempts to a \ oid sei i dee of the
Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings ("Motion") and the effect of Writ of
Execution by departing Wyoming for Idaho, re-registering the Motor Home and Suzuki
Sidekick and subsequently selling them in I as V egas, Nevada See Statement of the
Facts UI51-57. Although Rappleye has not appealed the Trial Court's Order of Execution
with respect to the proceeds of the Motor Home and Suzuki Sidekick, these facts may

have been relied on as further evidence of the Rappleye's and Hodges' attempts to avoid
payment of the judgment amount to Plaintiff.
As Rappleye has failed to marshal all evidence in support of the Trial Court's
findings he seeks to challenge, its findings of fact should be assumed as correct.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ORDER EXECUTION OF
RAPPLEYE'S PROPERTY UNDER HODGE'S NAME.
Rappleye argues that the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Rapple

ye's property placed under Hodges' name because i) Hodges was not a party to the
proceeding and the Trial Court failed to make a determination of a fraudulent transfer;
and ii) the Trial Court did not give full faith and credit to the Missouri court's Divorce
Decree and the Bankruptcy proceeding. Rappleye's full faith and credit argument was
raised for the first time in his Motion to Reconsider. (R at 1062-1070). Rappleye,
however, fails to cite to any legal authority to support this position.5
In Utah, appellants have the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue, not matter
how recently it was raised. State of Utah v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which is applicable
to an appellee through Rule 24(b), an [appellant] must provide an argument
containing the contentions and reasons of the [appellant] with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, and parts of the record relied on.' When an
[appellant] fails to comply with this rule, we will decline to address the issue
5

Rappleye also failed to support this argument with any legal authority in
the Trial Court. (R at 1062-1070).
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because the 'reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research.
Id. (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). See also
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct'App.) ( I his Court has routinely

therefore, should not consider Rappleye's unsupported arguments related to jurisdiction.
a.

The Trial Court Made a Determination that the Transfer Was
Fraudulent and Hodges' Interests Were Represented Throughout the
Proceeding.

R apple;) ;re' 's position that the I i ial Coi n: (: did not have ji irisdiction to order the
execution of the Fidelity Investment Accounts under H o d g e s ' name because it allegedly
did not adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff s fraudulent conveyance claim and H o d g e s '
• interests were not i epresented dm ing tl le proceeding is withoi it i i lerit Indeed. R apple} e
has at no time offered any legal authority to support this position. 6
Hodges took an active part in the proceedings. She attended both hearings held on
Plaintiffs Writ of Execution, as well as the Supplemental Proceeding held on September

6

Rappleye also claims that plaintiff herself has shown concern for this
issue based on her simultaneous action in Provo. Plaintiff was not aware of the
existence of the Fidelity Investment Accounts until several months after the Provo
action was commenced and only became aware through formal discovery.
Otherwise, Plaintiff would have initially filed a Writ of Execution to execute on
monies held in the Fidelity Investment Accounts prior to commencement of the
Provo action.
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25, 2001. (R at 1451, pg. 139; Exhibit E, pg. 1). Hodges filed a Request for Hearing
which resulting the proceeding. (R at 885-886; see Appendix, Exhibit "J").
In fact, Hodges' counsel, Mr. Quesenberry, even asked the Trial Court if she could
sit by counsel's table because "she's got Exhibits and stuff."7 (R at 1451, pg. 4). She
testified, on direct and cross examination, on her behalf. (R at 1451, pg. 120-139).
Hodges' son-in-law), Brad Brown, who has in the past provided her with financial advice,
also testified on her behalf at both hearings. (R at 891; 1451, pg. 5-9). Hodges brought
several documents which were entered into evidence as exhibits to support her claim that
she brought money into her initial marriage with Rappleye. (R at 891).
In its Memorandum Decision, contrary to Rappleye's assertions, the Trial Court
noted that Rappleye "essentially conceded at oral argument that he fraudulently conveyed
his interest in the Branson Lake Resort to Hodges..." (R at 1013.) Moreover, the Trial
Court entered a factual finding therein that "[e]ven if Defendant's claim that he was
reimbursing Hodges [for the alleged stock loss] was accepted by the court, he had no
legal obligation to do so and the transfer does not defeat Plaintiff s judgment against
him." (R at 1005.) Clearly, the Trial Court found the transfer to be fraudulent. This
conclusion is explicit throughout the Memorandum Decision and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Mr. Quesenberry also represents Hodges in the Provo action.
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b.

The Trial Court Had The Authority to Adjudicate The Fraudulent
Transfer in the Execution Proceeding.

Rappleye argues that the Trial Court did not have the authority to adjudicate the
fraudulent transfer in an execution hearing. Rappleye again fails to cite any legal
authoi it)/ to a.d.i; ance his position
Utah courts have held that transfers of assets could be set aside in garnishment
proceedings and that it is unnecessary to file a separate action to obtain such relief. Rule
69(s), Utah Rules * ;
judgment < I^M

; rrocedure, also expressly provides that property of the
. possession of any person, or property" di le to the judgment debtor,

may be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. Therefore, although the Fidelity
Investment Account of Hodges was executed upon, such execution was appropriate since
part of ft le money held in the account beloi lgs to R apple y e.
Utah courts have long held judgment creditors can set aside fraudulent
conveyances through execution, garnishment, and attachment proceedings. In Jensen v.
Eames, M 9 P.2d 236,239 (19 74), the Utah Supreme Court held that a transfer of stock

it was not necessary to file a separate action to obtain such relief. Similarly, in Stine v.
Girola, 337 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court held that when a
transaction all("|»nl HI .I j.;aim,shiiiw»l pmi mlinj; uuisfiluled a u\\m\ between HMIIN nlii.il
judgment debtors and a corporation, they could be considered identical for purposes of
garnishment proceeding.
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Rule 69(s), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
(s)

Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master may
order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the possession of the judgment debtor or any other person, or due to the
judgment debtor, to be applied towards satisfaction of the judgment.8

Finally, the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act specifically provides for the levy of
execution against the asset transferred or its proceeds, when the creditor has a judgment
against the debtor, as follows:
(2)

If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or
its proceeds.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8(2).
The Trial Court had the authority, in law and equity, to order the levy of execution
on Hodges' Fidelity Account.
c.

Full Faith and Credit Has No Application In This Case.

Rappleye claims without legal authority that the Trial Court failed to give full faith
and credit to the Missouri court's Decree of Dissolution of Marriage ("Decree") and the

8

Utah law also provides that a every court has the authority to:

(1)

compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding;

(9)

devise and make new process andforms of proceedings, consistent
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) & (9) (emphasis added).
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decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Coi it I: in Missoui i R appleye fails to note, however, that
this Decree resi llted from an agreement entered into by Rappleye and Hodges, just three
(3) days after being sealed in the LDS temple located in Dallas, Texas, and that the Trial
Court found their divorce to be a "sham" (R ai 14M; pg. MM !(»>, K .il HO ' I 11 i I
Rappleye and Hodges concealed llu* ilivon.v fiom l.iiinl y,, 11 leini-s .itnl (In-n
church | V ,il I I1- i, pg. 104 -106; R at 1402,1414.) The extent of the sham is further
evidenced by the fact that the Marital Settlement and Separation Agreement, which was
incorporated into the Decree, provides that Hodges pre-marital h uilli * ,is % 1111J HUM M),
and Rappleye's per-nhiril.il M»ilh \\v> only $S<){>,0i IH| wliili1 t IKY testified under oath in the
execution proceedings that Rappleye's premarital worth was approximately $300,000.00.
(R at 1451, pg. 127, line 20-23.)
Rappleye also fails to note that Jn concealed (IK littllt .iboul Ins legal and iinaneial
interest itt the Branson Property while under-oath during the bankruptcy trial. (R at 1451,
pg. 36:19 - 38:17.) Application of the full faith and credit doctrine to the Decree and/or
the decision of the Bankruptcy court would have the effect of rewarding Rapple} •;'.
perjurous testimony and v alidating Rappleye and I lodges "sham" divorce. The full faith
and credit doctrine has no operation in this case.
V.

THE TRAIL COURT WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS IN
DETERMINING RAPPLEYE AND HODGES' INTERESTS TN
BRANSON PROPERTY.
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Rappleye asserts that Appellant's percentage of the proceeds from the sale of
Branson Property should be calculated by dividing his established contribution of
$144,000.00 by the purchase price of $330,000.00. The Trial C

it found that the total

amount transferred from Rappleye's and Hodges' separate Fidelity Investment Accounts
on January 4, 1994, was $297,579.79. (R at 1451, pg. 44-45; Appendix, Exhibit UC".)
The Trial Court ruled that the "best evidence" as to Rappleye's interest in the proceeds
from the sale of the Branson Property is the wiring instructions which evidences in
writing that 48.39 percent of that transfer came from Rappleye's separate property. (R at
1451, pg. 44-45; Appendix, Exhibit "C ".)
Rappleye's contention is that another $32,500.00 was used to purchase the
Branson Property and that no evidence was introduced to show whether Rappleye or
Hodges contributed that amount.9 The evidence presented to the Trial Court showed that
Rappleye and Hodges made every attempt to equally share the costs associated with the
purchase of the Branson Property. It is certainly reasonable to assume that the additional
amount of approximately $32,5000.00 was also equally shared by Rappleye and Hodges.
Given the fact that Rappleye and Hodges have failed to offer any evidence showing
that Hodges paid the additional $32,500.00, it was well within the Trial Court's discretion

9

Rappleye and Hodges paid $25,000.00 in earnest money in October,
1993, pursuant to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. Rappleye and Hodges would
have then paid an additional $8,500.00 (approximately) at closing. (R at 1531;
Appendix, Exhibit "A" & "C".)
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against the clear weight of the evidence.10
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not commit reversible error in ruling that the concealment
prong of the disco\ ei y i i lie applies it i tl lis case. Tl le applicatioi i of the legal i i lie of
fraudulent concealment to the circumstances in this case is left to the Trial Court under
Utah law. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff established an overwhelming primae facie
case of fraudulent.transfer, that Plaintiff could not 1 lave kno wi 1 about hei claim for
frai idi llent cone .ealme tit until \ pi il, 2001, and that Plaintiff acted reasonably and with due
diligence at all times. Rappleye has not marshaled any evidence to show that these
findings were against the clear weight of the evidence.
Even if (IIIM: I "oinl ivic (o conclude 111« t f (he Vvu\\ < <' nil erroneously applied Ih
concealment prong of the discovery rule, it constitutes harmless error as the Trial Courts
entered findings of fact which meet the elements of statutory discovery rule contained in
the UFTA. The Trial Court specifically found that Plaintiff could not have known about

whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the fraudulent transfer and full faith

10

Given the undisputed facts that Rappleye managed the Branson
Property and made significant physical improvements thereto, and that Rappleye
and Hodges' monetary contributions were roughly equal, Plaintiff requested that
the Trial Court find that she was entitled to 50 percent of the proceeds of the sale
•of the Branson Property.
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•

and credit issues raised in his Brief. Rappleye failed to cite to any legal authority. More
importantly, the authority cited herein shows that these issues are without merit.
For these reasons, the Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the Trial Court's
decision contained in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on
Execution.
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2003.
O^feORNE & BARNfflLL, P.C.

Matt<
Attorney for Plaintiff Marilyn Johnson
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APPENDIX
Exhibit U A" -

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-10

Exhibit "B" -

Real Estate Purchase Contract dated October 19,1992, between Edwin
Michel, Duval-Michel Investment, Inc. dba Michel's Motor Lodge and G.
Bryce Rappleye and L. Jean Rappleye (Introduced at the evidentiary
hearing on March 6,2002 as Exhibit "2" and attached to Plaintiffs
Hearing Brief for Motion for Contempt, Application of Property and Writ
of Execution as Exhibit "2", which was filed on December 12, 2001).

Exhibit U C" -

Warranty Deed by Corporation to G. Bryce Rappleye and L. Jean
Rappleye from Duvall-Michel Investment, Inc. (Introduced at the
evidentiary hearing on March 6, 2002 as Exhibit "3"and attached to
Plaintiffs Hearing Brief for Motion for Contempt, Application of Property
and Writ of Execution as Exhibit "3", which was filed on December 12
2001).

Exhibit "D""

Wiring Instructions to Lee Datesman and Kyle Russell signed by L. Jean
Roberts and George Bryce Rappleye (Introduced at the evidentiary hearing
on March 6,2002, as Exhibit "M" and attached to Plaintiffs Hearing Brief
for Motion for Contempt, Application of Property and Writ of Execution
as Exhibit M, which was filed on December 12, 2001).

Exhibit "E"

Partnership Records with Charter Number X00250636, registration date
February 4,1993 (Introduced at the evidentiary hearing on March 6, 2002
as Exhibit "E" and attached to Plaintiffs Hearing Brief for Motion for
Contempt, Application of Property and Writ of Execution as Exhibit "E",
which was filed on December 12,2001).

Exhibit " F " -

Quick Claim Deed with Statutory Acknowledgment, dated Septei i ibct 1
1993 between George Bryce Rappleye and Linda Jean Rappleye
(Introduced at the evidentiary hearing on March 6, 2002 as Exhibii il4 ' and
attached to Plaintiffs Hearing Brief for Motion for Contempt, Application
of Property and Writ of Execution as Exhibit "4'\ which was filed on
December 12, 2001).

Exhibit "G" -

Statutory Warranty Deed from dated December 3, 1993 from Linda Jean
Rappleye to Linda Hodges (Introduced at the evidentiary hearing on March _.
6, 2002 as Exhibit "7" and attached to Plaintiffs Hearing Brief for Motion
for Contempt, Application of Property and Writ of Execution as
Exhibit"7", which was filed on December 12,2001).

Exhibit "H" -

Bankruptcy Opinion; United States Bankruptcy Court, Western District of
Missouri, Southern Division in Case No. 95-60100 filed May 28,1997;
George Bryce Rappleye, Debtor Marilyn Johnson, Plaintiff v. George
Bryce Rappleye, Defendant (Introduced at the evidentiary hearing on
March 6,2002, as Exhibit "41" and attached to Plaintiffs Hearing Brief
for Motion for Contempt, Application of Property and Writ of Execution
as Exhibit "41", which was filed on December 12,2001).

Exhibit "I"

Stipulation and Order Re: Supersedeas Bond dated January 27, 2003.

-

Exhibit "J" -

Request for Hearing signed and submitted by Linda Jean Hodges on
December 11,2001.
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Cited.
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TOX Missouri Association ol REALTORS*

RE 555D - Contract for the Sale of Real Estate 1 7 5 6
With Contingencies

n MO

* «*

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTBACT.IF NOT UNOERSTOOO, S K K COBPETENT ADVICE.
THECONTRACT,madeamJentertdrntoWs .
IStfe
dsyot
October
J 9 ? L . by and between
fTTWln I f l c h e l , P n v a l - M 1 ^ * 1 l m n » « t m A n t < t t f i c . PSA K l r h f t V t H f l t f i r I ruige*
theSeler.

- A . fi. Bryr.g Rappleye & L, Jean Rapplev*

n* Buyer

The lame Scfer and Buyer may be after singular or phtral according to wWch«raivM«KaJbyttie»gnaluri!$below.
WITNESSETH: For a«J h consideration of the mutual obbgatfora of (he parties hereto, the Seller beieby agreestosell end coon/ tfto Hie Buyer and the Buyer agrees lo purchase
Iro»Selef.tpDnlt» terms artfcc^tioiw^
Taney.

.siaitoiMiMowiT^wit Property c o w m l y known as Hlchel's Motor Lodge, Rocfcaway Beach,
3» consisting of 3*03 acres H/L and a l l Improvements thereon. Recorded legal description to goverr
e l l e r to provide complete equipment l i s t s 5 days after acceptance of tbts contract. A l l equipebt ft appliances to be In working order a t closing. Buyer to Inspect a l l aottages ft hone 2 days
efore closing. Any Hens on the property* famishing*, ft equipment to be paid off on or before
losing. Taxes to be prorated. Seller to furnish t i t l e Insurance ft survey of the property with
boundaries flagged before closing. Seller w i l l assist buyers for 5 days on an 8 hour basis or at
inch tine no longer needed. Guest l i s t s , nailing l i s t s , promos, printed materials being used are a
tart of t h i s purchase. Advanced deposits or reservations to be given to Buyer a t closing.
Idvertlslng for 1993 prepaid w i l l be prorated at d o s i n g . Buyer ft Seller agree to s p i l t closing
:osts paid to t i t l e escrow company.
together with fie following described peroral crcperty, II any, now located thereon,to-wit,etedric, phmbing, holing end air cond&oniftg fixtures and equipment attached Hear
c o w i « i window sharJo.»ene^^

per Inventory l i s t s , furniture, appliances, equipment, truck, a l l 23 unit furnishings,
^jtt^tlauJlnens.
subject,tamer,toany reservations, easements or rwtfdioratf nconi™4*yio^\an±ii)gda\to<X ^n*Kailkdin<) the said properly, as vrtt not matersaBy Werefcre
The pricefarsaidpryglystalll*,.
said PWSfil*&!&'^ " " « = * > f, m
r qj r M" «wy »u; a» «we w i—
wnn
D0UARS;tobeptidby
» wnwq, rt :euo "t "n«i w
— f ^^vut «tvw
ww
> vt >wi vw
rw
DOUARS;tobept«fby
cf$ > 2 u » 0 0 0 . 0 0
J - _ . «
*lttataiwoJlhee*eeuiiimandde*^
Buyer astotals;
A e S r t * . and en^ch
l l e^d -*»fh
t
• H ^is,c*e—
^ Branson
Lalce Country R e a l t y / I n t e r e s t bearing acct. interest to Buyer.
as agent for Die Setter, as earnest money, and as i pari of the purchase price and eomJdwriort for this agreement and shaB be deposited as soon as practicable, but not l & r
flan Jive p j tanking days ar.tr the date of final acceptance of the contract by aU parties, and *po» deflwy of the deed as hereinafter provided, the Buyer shaB pay the balance
of the purchase price lo Sefcr as tofjom: if Seler agrees to fasts part of the purchase prite at heteJnafler set forth, by dcfl*ring the note and deed of trust as hercnsJter
provided: or if 9oytr h asswrnng and agreeing lo pay the note secured by a deed of bust which is presently outstanding as hereinafter set forth, by the Boyar accepting defcery
ofa deed cwt»togfoeassumption ngrcenic^
AH of the Genera* Safes CcndiDons and Closing Practice! and any Financing or Special Agreements, el as te$ forth below and on Ihe reverse skfe hereof, an hereby made
a part ol U » Contract Perostfoa fs hereby granted by Settet end Buyer for the agent to provide sales data information v> this transection, {nefuding seling price and properly
address, to The local Board of REALTORS*. Its members,, reembe/s prospects, appraiscrsand other profctsionat users of reel estate setes data.
A.
a.

A 7>ibcorAaaisrH)l5urjJtdloBuy?fot)»in^tm«»cir»9.
— This contract Is given sdbjaet to the Buyer's abftlly lo obtainfinancingunder the term* and condtttow set forth In 1 % 5S50/A - E r f * * A. Financing Acjrieroenis'
attached hereto and incorporated herein as set forth verbatim.

A.
w
6. -

CONTRACT WMTWGINdES (Ctedk AorB}
This oortrad k not subject lo any condrgencies, except those as to Me requirement herein set forth and 'RE 5HO/A - Eslebtt A. financing Agrerrwnbr (if sad
eihibHb attached hereto)
This contiad b sutjec!tocertain contingencies that are set forth in RB550/B • EahibX 0. Cortnd Contingencies", attached hertto and mcorporated herein as fl
set forth verbatim.

Triew«WJr«toiKBcontj»dsh3lbedc«^alfteotficcof
m

tpTpQ ^ 0 ? i

Trl-lafceS

ESCrOW

«

l

Mx^onn.Mar**,

H^JafWiary

»»
*
o'clock
M.oraJ}0C^otnertm»aMplacea9fhepadksfi^m^
IrtfBlrtfBrecrfdcstogpwybeerfert^byte
PtBs«swn»h^be«teBvrrtyJtofceBuy^
Closing
———,.,

, —

,0^^

ifa>tthewftw.ittbiadtolh8i^tsof
vrl»occupiesthapremises.

The Seller ogrees to pay the agent die commission agreed upon beoweea theai.
flEAl ESTATE DtSClOSURE TO BUYER BY S S I B T S AGENT: Buyer acknoMfedpei thai Buyer has bean iniorsied eraEy, at the firm the Agent eVtained personal and froncal
Iplomiattorv or provrded ottier spodhc asstsUncc. and by fits vrtten ^tdtmm, thai (t) Ihe fating end cooperating C*t\\*41 brokers worllng through their salespeople era acting
on behalf of \h* Seller of the real estate; (2) the sovrcefs) of any commission or other payment to he nade to the Agent is from the (StlUr) (or
.
); and (3) intonnatlon given lo the Agent by the Buyer imybed&loscd t o t e Seller
M WTNESS WHEREOF, the Buyer touecrfeirMs agrecmenl o> tff&Y *"* ^ ffttifcRoQ?^
*** Mknowfednas receipl of one copy o) fhb cont«oct which offer set
krth hewn sha* «itc<i»et^^^
*ytfl
day of u c ^ U P e r
, w 5 L . i l not accepted by Setter by that time CJ wilMWm
bry Buyer prior lo that
"
Date.

^cfler hereby J | Kjecls
* \ » . Iheforegoa^offoMtlorfhinlf^ari^adoatM
| j counter offers
*
•
5e*jrt counter oHer shal autowelicatry e*p*e t l
U on the
day ol
^SctapftortoftaihflM.
tS»*r - j L / b c t r B V ^ ^ V U**-f-*f

K.r-^-*-*-'

OiU

~

„

•'- • • *
»

_ :

Tim.

, il not accepted by Beyer by Ibi; time or withdraym

,

_ H

S&l

ii)rwacc^stricflirfer'»co«ntoolferniadeonfie
day of
, 1 9 Tone
W. on the
(Jay of
,
i9
Jime
M. Buyers Wbals
Ms transaction |$ co-brotered through
The undecigned ogent acknowledges receipt of the earnest money deposit
ml confirms that the raqwed agency disclosure has been rode bi accordance with MBEC Rule 14 CRS 250-0,095.
igent

by:

Date

Oct. 5. 20C!

S--03PM
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GENERAL CLOSING CONDITIONS and SALES PRACTICES
Tin mat ginJ t«i**Mf of Ar Mrions /mrmfnphx hrr**f mr mfrveVd IWMJJT

rmirrrwWr mf rcftrmtr

mi ahoff n* a*

*rmt*

It nttdtfj. pUet enj tamwtrietim apm, or txphun preruse* o/fnl* cMlrort.

•lbi/r«<r • » *
o#mf noun**

The Stow «h*lt irkMrt 39 dsya p»tor le dott of eibetoo, dettrer to the Buyer • i Abetted ef Tin* lo eald property cerMed to tfde by e ceropetfnt tbttrecter
thenlng «tc itee mxtetoble In fact to The Seller and Use*, estetsieeikts,

is end mechanics Rem of recmd ettectirio, smd properly, subject herrcrr* «o

any eeceptions hereto staled.
The Buy-r »h»U have »«» {IP) doy« altar avch defter y to rxamtop sattf abstract and H Ihr tide ol eatd feel property is deltetore, U M Buyer m"* » « • > t h e abjections to wain? and deitrcr Ihi tan* i» the Sefer at the oftce el the aooot will** ie* (JC) days eflet >ach dcHrtryef toe itoinoct. The Setter * r » i
IMJwrtimUHt

boee any tuch detocK enrmctod ntlhto >mty (W» day* hew tae dole rt « ^ I » « T O ' ^ * ^ « ^ < > « ^ > ^ < ^ M c U appewilngte it» «b3lr»^ «»df»«»i <*)«>

to,

eacrpillrooIrecorOnttKhcenbercnmfedoeetcoireety
ed.»anyo»e»ddefectsunoted arenptcoireciedwitoJnsfartyIteldoysormr deltery of seenobjecliom Ike*this taaoedsheftbe m»f andtoeJ nnd toeervnes*
money deposited as aforesaid shal be returnee la Hie Buyer end fh* ebsitect returned to (ha Saitar.
toflewof eV Seta rumMdrmtoBeyer oodtAOctrm*^
7T#V

•airwrr

o v e r ' s poltyof title toteraneo. Am; c e a ^
toeetf by a lifetoaunrccecompany ttenead to anile IMttoeurenc*toaJecaaeat *rech pefcy ohed fature the ewei'»litfe to be marMtoMe to tod at celled for
by tins c o ^ a c t a ^ shaft pwrdoahat a

p ^

owner's litfe lasurenee »bal be paid by the Seler, and Hie ptomlom of Ike inonoogeea Ude policy, ft any. shell be poJd by th* Beye*.
H b tmderstood and agreed tfiH fMi bcftfit ra^i*eo* to be leneahed la reerbetoWe W»* aa set feiOk to Tree Sltndartf I ef fto )«»0to1 far N la etoa

*****

Vial any cncun*f»*ce ot detoct to toe Kile erfddt to W I N A fat scaae ef aay af aNe TMe Sfandtoda of Ida Mejottt Bar »ba» net ce*su*jto • vafW obtocftort on
t N pet of toe Buyer, provided t » SeBeitor»a»l»etoaeradavlto, m eOwf ttfle papeto, if aey deeerAad to toe applicable stonier*
.VWfrr to nmrty

I I N trite to aeid rial property be matfccUbto to tort aa caftod tor bettto. ** SeBtt ahei tfctm tditoetoeyerai the office of sakt Seffcr's afctif • yinenl

*y wtmrnntt

fwrMiTf dttd bet and dear torn aM Sena and encambraecea nwebaewf, cxetpt ae hereto pierktod, end toe buyer thai Itiro and Ibere pay pie bitoncr. Jf
any. ef urd cae«i paynreni ami deltm to Ibe Srfet l i t neli and deed e* trwn, • eny, fwetobefere prerMed la*.
Tin Seier tfteBpey to lull aDSTstt, Coetdy and Mwddpif teawawd aaMataeaaH. general end apadal. wbJdiaree Ben ea Mb/ pYeperto eeeenf hwea tor W.t
onenrtor year wrick sliiel b» Bforalid aa el Vie daea of * e deteery el toe dard. M toe amoeet of laiea camel tocn be ajtoiajncd. pretfiTtoo abod te

Tmxu,
muwmtutt
«ne*rca&

competed en toe aMeunt of ocecreltoxcalev Ike pruedtofj calendar year. The ransat horn aaid reel property. It any, Jin* pa la toe SeBer picritod to d.<de ot
ddtoery of too deed and to ton Buyer tttorsaftor. Scwrty depeata and adVanse tents, ff any, anatf be paid to fhryer at ctottof. to the ereat Jtlet bee few to
mefknh) e Oases*torto»«s,ewdrnnawnts siwl be nynBedtoward** paplaaot el SoOar'a oblajri4to« itodertofspat<grfph and the* t t **J»?rrd to Bvyrr and
Peyo ahall tetrattess SaPerfoi anpeooesaerer the eiimmtefSHlM'aaetto^Otoniotatoretodtaae^
«btojotloM hereatidor, 5ef>er «kafl pay to Bvytr toe aweawt ef any dBhreoco.
It H viHlerstxd arid r.grccd ftait Mctvao ol Ow tarondwoenla ef the pertka, dial 8ma b of tf» easence i f W t oerernrcM, irri 8 ft? S-Jtr hr* »-|H
Stlkt'S r « t of iMo aese^ienf by toinbMnp Ntcrlstoire tide as befell fneeided, and itai Beyer Hl» to coaBpty Hft Hit r<rrp4iT^r««f rf <«<s pyr-mrnt *i»Y$

pttffitm

ten ( i q <fcy» fe?H»tt;t. Ren the money rtrposfled m aforenaJ shaft b? pdd over to fhe Softer aa l9£b>rttd 'fanrfpf, attur* eVfm?Ti br*r»o 4ffteoJ ff r-Ji
baposgrl-V to axMlda, *»d IWo oyaemeni aioy or iney not bs thsfsafter eperatfre, of tic epden & ttm Settr. 3-J*r'5 aptH ^taP not a - SPHC for tn? e - t r - »
rnonty to trs evpesfi^l w hncto provbird ontd acti*ily to t r Jiwat of cash to i n hoods of the «gt"t ff Snyer H H i M l te r«T ***b'ooei r»«nrrt
motray ^cpffidl vhoa d-jt ( I itaokcd by the centred) er If the cnmaA raeney deposit to to be fired ever to S-f or en aqstcfetod Arm*)?* hi*r**n of frr***^ - '
Gwycr 10 pctrerra a? hct^fiwndjt prrvid9d. then die cameat moneyfepoerfobol pje Urn reword retodrerotof evpenttt of $?tor or S?fV*< Hpi* bietmrd to vHt
tronsrdHn, and ?h? taia.v.c k H y aid 0ne4lr>t ( h ) to Setter end Ctn>4MI f » to Ssfo'a named Oftrd to Hon of caeondssfen, peovlftd horr<<er. thrt tht 2.rtt

Jtirtiftt

rJCMI ric21? no rv*d nc*We nny *•*» c* muir*/ for Me rs>kr» grsahv Bern the nmoent erjNKd to ee crswafecton. f=fsr -md rSyoi atrrt V r i to ton «?*-K M
adfxroteore t*i »rt«s m fcricffcra ol anyspri^il Metay*rWbyC»rrioter, thebreter afiolloM wf*dcrftf* to •»'•? er-ren aproum~.ifl»tt*i Pi:*ri <^{''tnlvxn ttr> ^ ^ hcto dl frrirM cm toe 0^09 to djrfwttom m
ft shell he Setter's' etfrpatton ot been die Improvements m the saM'property fuBytoeerodondt tho deli of teOMery of the deed lo the Buyer. If On »«.

frmprrt} t»
trktpt

pre?3M7nts re ii»c sidd F*P**f

** »b3t«nt1aMy damaosd er dnboyed by Ore or ether cesvrity odor to toe cieothf of #et oato. tore tkf tfeiyer ihs? h r ?

rim opfket ol occepfag sf oftoetoamrncrcrocccdr. «nd precetdhio; wBh Ma perfonnencc cnttor Ihh cooHoct, «r canceflton rhh) csOncI r4irtet<nm the r^.r—«
ra^*ttsy d^oelred rcofr-esaM !dra« trs letmnsd to f ^ fhnr^
Mider this contract ami Setter hfto emccd karrto fe rtrvnc* r p r t o l f s purchase pike, then Piryer must eUton oae fie Irtsieence p*ovx£s *n
toetoipteveinoiirs.or Stller a| Seffor'a elecitoo can canceliNo cantract.
In toe n«nd tic pailici hrrrlo oato fhnl anytoturaccepofcy an •>; arepcrtr «te>bcct fr?orts h t9 be r o t f t r d to Pvyrr. t > n at tho ftm* H ctostog evyer

+rx?

Atxignvni*

to pjf 538ei pro rare rnj amceml cl oncamsd Insurance rtieaibjra themmder end the pcecy she! b< asslgnrd to Buyer, to V K frcrrt ftoi Bnysr te emumMj h.

• f MJN*«M«

dbbardnna el do p o r t l y *hkSi b o?cwcd by a dsed of Oust and Hie tvajer tvfjm
a caelmtretlort of fhe rtMfttjK* depesff nndo by tho 9cfer. fhen Ike S??S
shelf esrlew sob} cepocft to the BVycr and dm Qoyvr sfmV letodtone fhe Seffor for the enow* toercaf.

fpnimile

b* mi teisfcy art tfectotf by ai pufleo to thai O r i r a d to le Ibe 5RK» »d »n wlptool stonatore te I N * Connact; o kxahoP* of Ufa CooNcl. krkvfns r>» sfoivfvr

* iewnim

pari at Ihoteof. ehat be trsated and ief :d open by oft perron ha do as an mlojtoef cordrod end t n tutknitk iipneture sift to* some fegal feres aid tK;ct n

Tnc^ir.ftj slonetuvs".«that term Is ceoononfy u?*d rflhrelersoce lofactbnUr middoco at»J In trammrtWny itocwmtnt?. styietwes, pSotro.^?. t>..% rJ^t

fhoagh lbs tocslreie b i n tad Iha oriptoal dacvaaem to nhfcha peidene ahjnatore has bi
h la hntow undatmvvd that «w aojent
to the n p i k ar eeadOjiaa of any ef the

twyarantwcyreyite;r<elhwr^ioewettot<aaMteaipyapaily,et dbDiaponcteotooleoreey may revcot. or ai
ar baproveenmte eHwaaed upon eeid above deecrfbed rerd propefty.

SPECIAL AGREEMENTS

$1,000.00 w i l l be held in escrow # n t i l spring when pool can be opened fc f i l t e r s & pool can be
Inspected & confirmed to be operating. Purchase includes a l l 23 rental units consisting of
cabins & inotel units situated on 3 different .locations. 5 rental s i t t i n g on South West side o f
street, (4 unit complex 4 large cabin) making up f i v e units. House a storage buildings, pool,
signage. Seller will share half the costs of laying new frost free water lines h covering &
insulating existing lines on the North East side o f street to make them rentable for the winter
season.
Buyer w i l l f o r f e i t $20,000.00 earnest money i f they do not close per this agreement* excepting;
death or permanently disabled.

Appreted by Lege! Cetmeet tor toe etbeotftl Amaeiatton ef HEAL TORS'
Perm |*5WD - Fa* oato by toa ttloenurt Amcteoton ef ACAlfOftS*
P O. Bo. mi. Cofmwbie. MO 5570^1X11 O^yrlcjhl 1170. Revised reowmbcr, t « 0 .
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RE 555D/B - EXHIBIT B
Contract Contingencies

r ^ i 1756

(Only those paragraphs which art completed shal be applicable)

A. CONTRACT TO BE CONTINGENT W O N SALE OF OTHER PROPERTY This sate is at tne oplion ot the Buyer, contingent on the sale and the dosing
I such sale ot Buyer's property located at (Address)
n the

_

. day of .

t9

, „

(City)

(Stale)

In the event the closing of such sate is no! completed, through no fault of lhe Buyer, this

onlract shall at the oplion ol the Buyer be votd* and upon Buyer's request earnest money less any expenses incurred by or on behaH of Buyer, shall be refunded
0 Buyer
(1) ScJter shall cave the right to cancel this contract at any time by giring Buyer

hours written notice Said time penod writ commence

at i t * p o m r time vt»en the Buyer or Buye/s agent has adust knowledge of Setter's written notice Th« cancellation shall be effective automatically unless
within 8etd time penod after receipt of such notice the Buyer shaft notify the Seller in wnbng that he w l l compter* lhe purchase of said properly even though
the contingency fa paragraph A has not been fulfilled
(2) In the went of ibo removal ot this conbngency based upon Seller giving notice as outlined m paragraph (1) berem. Buyer shall close on dosing
dale scheoufed m the sale corwacl
B CONTRACT TO BE CONTINGENT UPON BUYER OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT The parties hereto agree performance under the terms ol this contract
shall be expressly contingent on the emproyroent of
to said individual on the

_

day ot

.

. t9

with

.. ,, .

under the forms acceptable

In the event such oraploymertl « nol obtained Una contact shall be nuH wd

votd and the earnest money deposit shall be returned lo Buyer
C CONTRACT TO BE CONTINGENT UPON THIRD PARTY INSPECTION: The parties hereto agree performance under the terms ol tha contract shall be
expressly contingent on an inspection by a third party or parties on Buyer's behalf Within

,3.8

days after the final acceptance of the soles contract

Buyer, at Buyer s option and expense has lhe right to obtain written inspection reports from reputable third party or parties as lo structural defects, environmental
hazards, pfumbirtg healing air conditioning and sewage systems, swimming pool, ofl mecranjal aquiprnerrt and appbances. and B y s t e p t s
, . —

I n

home

alter which lime thrs right shaft* be watvad Should the result of such inspections

not be acceptable to Buyer, Buyer sl-all have five (5) days m which to htrnish SePer a copy of the inspection report or reports and to notify Seller or Listing
Agent, ui witling of non-acceptabiiity Sailor shoH Have ftve (5) days from race** of the report and notification in which to agree to correct or repair the unacceptable
defects prior to closing or to enter into an agreement in writing with Buyer as to a monetary adjustment in liou of correction ol such defects Buyer shaO have
three (3) days in which lo accept Seller's proposal for repairs and correction of lhe defects; and a* Buyer shall tail lo do so, this contract shall become null and
void and the earnest money deposit, less any expenses incurred by or on bebalf of Buyer, shall be refunded to Buyer
O CONTRACT T O BE CONTINGENT UPON TERMITE INSPECTION: Prior to dosing a ficensed exterminator shaj inspect the residential dwelling and issue
a written certtfication showing the structure to be free of termites or other wood-boring insect infestation or serious damage caused by lemwlcs or other woodboring Insects. II infestation is found, Softer shall pay tha cost of treatment Ol { t f L C ^ f i j ^ j a l ^ ^ B ^ ^ " " ^ " y " ^
is lound SeTWr agrees to pay l f l t t * 8 * S £

£*>X^W

(I damage kom infestation

repairs^fra^igfliK^

tt.raniafMai7ttxraifrCMatM*^y;a^^
E. CONTRACT TO BE CONTINGENT UPON SELLER'S PREVIOUS CONTRACT. Buyer acknowledges that Setter has enterod into a previous contract tor
the sale of lhe property described herein with (Buyer)

, dated the

day ol

_

,

19

. and

this contract H subject lo the rights of tho previous Buyer and is conbngent upon said contract not being closed.
F CONTRACT CONTINGENT UPON BUYER'S LOAN APPRAISER'S INSPECTION. If repairs are required by Buyers loan appraiser Seller agrees to pay the
first %

ot repair tf estimated repairs exceed (hat amount, this contract shaft" be voidable at Buyer's oplion, and if declared void, the tamest

money deposit, less any expenses incurred by or on be lull of Buyer shall be relunded to Buyer
C CONTRACT CONTINGENT UPON WELL WATER SATISFYING STATE STANDARDS. This contract shall be contingent upon a lestfs) made by a stalecertified laboratory of the welds) supplying water to the dwelling which atdicatefg) the water to be satisfactory by Stale standards. The cost of said tesl(s) shall
be paid by the
al Seller's expense nol to exceed %

In the event the tesl(s) revealfr) (ha water to be unsatfsfaciory by Slate standards. Seller shall correct lhe problem
.

, and to furnish Buyer with a remspecuon /eportls) showing the water to be satisfactory by State standards

It the cost la correct lhe problem B greater than the sum agreed upon herein, this contract shall be voidable at the Buyer's option, and if declared void, the
earnest money deposit toss any expenses incurred by or on behaM of Buyer shall be refunded lo Buyer

Seta

Sdler .

©Approved by Legal Counsel lor me Missouri Association ot REALTORS*
f o r * RE5SSO/B Printed and for sale by the Missouri Association of REALTORS*
Copyngftt October 1991
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DUVALL-MICHEL INVESTMENTS, INC.
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of tht County of f A N E Y
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V

1

°'i*' **« ">* •»UHni undtr iht l«wt of tht Statt J
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AND N O / 1 0 0

5»»t« a!

MISSOURI

MISSOURI

• • Corporation

party * f »>•< flt»t part, in «on,id.ration of

ANT) OTHER CO0D AND VALUABLE C O N S I D E R A T I O N S

-

DOLLARS

r
*> fo It paid by C.BRYCE RAPPIEYE AND L.JEAN RAPPLEYE, HUSBAND AND WIFE
£ , o< tht County of
\L

7

TANEY

and Suit of

MISSOURI

part I E S

of Iht OKond port, the rtctipt who#tof H hereby acknowledged, t^d by vlriua and purtuanca of f Rttolwtlon of f t * ffoard of

,.

&
CXttctort of iat4 patty of tho flrtt part, doti by i H n t prtiinn, Crant. B»rg*in, S*tit Convoy »nd Confirm unto t h t »»fd part
£ , of tht tacond ptrt T H E I R
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.'< •
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| |
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oAd iltutit In tho County of

TANEY

«>d Statt of M I S S O U R I

5f» to-wftt
J/
ff ALL OF LOTS ONE (I), TWO (2), THREE (3) AND FOUR (4) IN BLOCK FIFTY-ONE (51), AND LOTS If
\f THREE (3) AND FOUIi <4) IN BLOCK FORTY-SIX. AND LOTS TEN (10) AND ELEVEN (11) IN BLOCK feJ§ FORTY-ONE (41) ALL IN ROCKAWAY BEACH! AS PER THE RECORDED P U T THEREOF FILED IN THE
$
% OFFICE OF THE RECORDER OF DEEDS, TAtfEY COUNTY, MISSOURI.
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the second part, and unto T H E I R
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Tho told party of thf lint part htrtby covenanting that if I* lawfully *«li«d of on InbVfaaiiblt tMata In f r t in fha prtmlMt hortlft

a £ convayad; thai It hot good Hghf fo convty tht • « * » ; thai tht Mid p'tmliei *tt fraa and cltar of o*y Incumpranca dona 0/ luffartd
fe by It or thoit **dt< whom It tttlrm; and that It will warvtnt and d«Und the title to tnt ••'<* prtmli«% uoro tht laid part^ES
^

Itcond part »^6 unto T M P I R

f

IN WITN£55 WHfRCOf. tha

&'

nfl v

'

*nd

DUVALL-MICHEL

0tA,

<' > i

,0fever
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Business Entity with Charter Number X00250636
Name BRANSON LAKE RESORT
Street
101 Lake Street: P.O. Box 86 City/State/Zip Rockaway Beach, MO 65740-0086
Business Type Fictitious Name
Registration Date 02/04/1993
Status Date 01/14/1994
Status
IP
Status History
Business Entity Name Search

Owners
Agent Name Search

Charter Number Search

Owners for the Business Entity with Charter Number X00250636
Name
1 George Bryce Rappleye
2 Linda Jean Rappleye

Street
101 Lake Street
101 Lake Street

City/State/Zip
Rockaway Beach, MO
Rockaway Beach, MO

Status History
Business Entity Name Search

Ownership
50%
50%

Charter Record
Agent Name Search

Charter Number Search
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QUIT CLAIM DEED
With Statutory Acknoivlnltfmcnt
THIS INDENTURE, Mode on the.-Utfv.doy of

.Srjftaiibui: . .

One Thousond Nine Hundred ond..I\kn^vy^h^ee

.. A U

„ ,t»y 0rH j between i^prac Jir^ce

.B»K>]$y^i.^irwjri«l«rj^a.
of the County of

,

. .

Taney

, in the Stole of Miwouri, porty.. .

of the first port. ond. .

Jgls&.Jecm.&EPisysj.s.fl^
of the County of.—^l*n^X

, in the Stote of Missouri, pony....

WITNESSETH, Thot the sold party.

„

of the >econd port.

„.of the hr^t port »n cunvideration of the Him of

^5??!?§-?o5.9fl?fr.ysJ-y^ifL^pr^J^j^Ji^A^AVAVLV
to-JUflU.^

>x>td by the port.y.

DOLLARS

ot the second port, the rccopt of which is heieby acknowledged,

do£ft....
by these present* Remise, Release end forever Quit Ooim unto the sold potty,. . * * of the
second port the following described lot, troct*. or porceb of lond, lying, being ond situote in the County of
...ftOfty, and Stote of Missouri, to»wit.

All of Lots One (1), Two (2), Thre* (J), arid Fotr (4) In Block Fifty-one (51), and
I/>ta Three (3) and Four (4) in Block Forty-six (46), and Lots Ton (10) and Eleven
(11) in Block Forty-one (41) a l l in R'>ckaway Beach, as per the recorded Plat thereof
filed in the Office of the Recorder ot Deeds, Taney county, Missouri.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tht tome with oil rights, immunities, priyileget ond oppurfenonc.** there*
to belonging unto the said party....... of the second port ond
ever, so thot neither the sold porty.
or persons formula*

her.

heirs ond oislgns for*

of the first port nor..-bis

. - or i n . . , J M J L - * » * — nome

...

hairs, nor ony other person

or behalf, shall or will hereafter claim or

dt^nand ony right or title to the aforesaid premises or ony port thereof, but they, and every one of them fhoH
by these presents be excluded ond forever barred.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said porty

„ of the first part h o ; * - . . . . . - hereunto set.-bis

b o n d . . - , ond t e a l . . . . the day ond year first obovc written.
Signed, Seoled ond Delivered In the pretence of

S1

^L?y o^llS^!i

On this

, 19

•'

.Vtv^'-.X.^^.^v^^^^-^EAL)

Geocge ***& Rappleyie'
...:..„.;............
..

S , N G U PIW

I >*•

. — . doy of.*

/

*

(S6AU
...-(SEAL)
(SEAL)

^N'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

before me ne'sonolly oppeored.

to me known to be the p e r s o n . . . . . . . . described in ond who executed the foregoing instrument, ond
ocknowledged t h o t . . . . . . . . . executed the same ov
The sold

- free act ond dead.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • • • . . • . . . . « further declored—

tobu single ond unmarried

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hove hereunto *,et my baml nod of fined my official icol,
ot my office In. - . . - . . . _ . . . . . — . .
My term of office as o Notary Public will t-Kpite

the doy o*h) ytor first above wntttn
. . . .

.,19...

W

ril2f if , 5 S 0 U V- w y
County of
Tn/vi'^/

'*
«*

MARRIED PERSONS' ACKNOWLEDGMENT
.

f

S

On Urn

w.V'#.lovnf-.;jL^/ry2ii«-.LJ. »9»-.,

S btfore ,ne ptrionally oppeorod <fe°F9P * ? Y » !^PPi?ye,. a j ; « r r l e d . person
/," vw* . . . . . • . • . . . • . « . . . . .
..--•
. . . .
J j KXXXXfc to n, c knjwn to b« the person iJetcnbed m <»tuj V.IIM C U C U M
$

ll.c f ••C9-»»ny

. M - j m c m , ond

ackrto*l*Hv)<,»u thot the* executed me lonr.c at tfnrtt* free cM v>d U*'cd

%

I N TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I h*;vt h e f u m o >ct my IwirvJ .jml affixed my ^flicml seal,
of mv office i n . „ i t i 4 - J J i , w « " ' ( , / " ' ' J * : ' . . »H 1. the doy und year I T S ! above written.
M / term of office T» O No'o'y P u b U will exp.ro
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30,6,33

IOOX0323 Met 1 7 3 6
Thia instrument la prepared bys
Linda Jean Rappleye
P.O. Box 86
Rockavay Beach, Miesouri 65740
(417) 561-4135

Thle apace reserved for uae
by Clerk of Courts

STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED
X, Linda Jean Rappleye, whoae poat office address ia P.O. Box 66,
Rockaway Beach, Missouri 65740, hereinafter referred to aa "the Grantor'1,
for good and valuable conaidcration, the receipt of which ia acknowledged,
hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey totlinda Hodgea, whoae poat office
addreaa la P.O. Box 66, Rockaway Beach, Mleaourl 65740, hereinafter
referred to aa "the Grantee*'* and the helra, aaaigna and successors of the
Grantee forever, all right, title intereat, eatate, lien, claim, equity,
and demand of the Grantor in and to the real property in Taney County,
Miaaourl, deacrlbed aa:

ALL Of LOTS ONE (1), TWO (2), THREE (3), AND POUR (4) IN BLOCK
FIFTY-ONE (51), AND LOTS THREE (3) AND POUR (4) IN BLOCK
FORTY-SIX (46), AND LOTS TEN (10) AND ELEVEN (11) ZN BLOCK
PORTY-ONE (41), LOT TEN (10) IN BLOCK FORTY (40) IN THE SUBDIVISION OP ROCKAWAY BEACH, MI8SOURI AS PER THE RECORDED PLAT
THEREOF, RECORDS OF TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI.

SUBJECT TO EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF RECORD, IF ANY.

The Grantor fully warranta the title to the above-described property
and will defend the sacie against the lawful claims of all peraona
whomsoever,
Thia Statutory warranty Deed la algned by the Grantor in the Pretence
of the witneaaea of the rp day of /)ffJy.n./».^..1S93.
WITNESSES:

GRANTOR:

ajWiT'/HcMI.

•

, ,

lino.//..!. R.eei.y.'-'

^ r

/

Brandy/^ Nichols
STATE OF MISSOURI
OdWNt3f-tjP^ANEY
/

/

ffa* r&fcM9ing instrument was acknowledged before me on the__;_day of

\tyc*&*t'c

1?53, by Linda Jean Rappleye, who personally appeared before m,

\%Mo a'dkaow lidded that *hc executed the samp a A h«*r fr<*n *<*t » ^

H*#.H.

n X 7 T T T T I T r r
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

Sf W 2 8 m?
IN RE:
GEORGE BRYCE RAPPLEYE,
Debtor.
Case No. 95-60100
MARILYN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v*.
GEORGE BRYCE RAPPLEYE,
Defendant.

Adv. No. 95-6025

FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant-Debtor George Bryce Rappieye filed a Chapter 7 petition seeking to discharge,
among other debts, obligations owed to his former wife, plaintiff Marilyn Johnson, as a result of a
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered by a Utah state court. Plaintifffileda timely complaint
to determine dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and (15), Appearances at
trial were: Plaintiff in person and by counsel J. Kevin Checkett; Debtor, in person and by counsel
Dan Nelson. After hearing the evidence and arguments, the court finds Debtor's obligations to
Plaintiflf are nondischargeable. The court has jurisdiction over this core proceeding and may enter
final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and 23 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A),(I),(J) and <0).
Thesefindingsand conclusions are consistent with those made on the record at the end of the
hearing and in a supplemental record, which shall be incorporated herein, but due to additional review
of the record, they may modify oralfindings.Any findbgs of fact designated in error as conclusions
of law shall be deemedfindingsoffeet;any conclusions of law designated in error asfindingsof fact
shall be deemed conclusions of law.

FACTUAL 3ACXGR0Ura>
These parties married in their fifties and divorced after approximately five years. Plaintiff had
been married previousiy for more than 20 years to a doctor in the Air F
spouse had six children. In the dissolution of that marriage, Plaintifi

. She had and her former
.eived a modest pension of

SI, 180 per month.
Prior to Debtor's 1995 bankruptcyfilingin Missouri, the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Wasatch County, Utah entered a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage between Debtor and Plaintiff in
1991. Pursuant to the Decree; Debtor was to pay a total of approximately 5206,000 to Plaintiff
including S5,000 for Plaintiffs attorney's fees. Debtor failed to pay any of these obligations.
During the marriage of Plaintiff Marilyn Johnson and Debtor George Rappleye, which lasted
only aboutfiveyears, the parties had both separate and joint property, and separate property which
was commingled and converted to joint or marital property. For example, at the time of the marriage
Debtor owned a hardware store. When Debtor and Plaintiff married, Plaintiff cashed in her Air Force
pension benefit, her primary asset, and contributed the 550,000 in proceeds to the hardware business
which she and Debtor jointly operated during their marriage. In the dissolution of marriage
proceedings, the state court judge found the hardware business was marital property. As will be
discussed below, the business was lucrative.
During the marriage plaintiff was unemployed except for her work without salary in the
hardware store. As found in the dissolution proceeding, she was 55 years old and had limited
education, training and job experience. Before the marriage, she had 51,180.00 per month income
from the Air Force pension which she cashed in and contributed to the hardware store. At and after
the dissolution, Plaintiffs income was only $800 per month. In contrast, Debtor was 56, in good
health, and had years of business and work experience. He owned at least two lucrative businesses,
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including the hardware store (which the state court held had been convened to marital property) ana
a hosiery business in California. In the dissolution, he received one haif of the proceeds of saie of the
hardware business, which totaled approximately SI82,000. He had retired and was not gainfully
employed, but in order to pay his monthly expenses of SI,875.00, he could look to the hardware
store sale proceeds and income of 225,000 per year from the hosiery business. When Debtor began
the hardware business in 1981, before the marriage, he earned 515,000 per year from the business,
and could earn at least that much and most likeiy significantly more based on his experience and
knowledge, as found by the Utah state court- In 1992, after the dissolution proceeding, Debtor's
income was $78,752.00. After that, his income allegedly dropped to virtually zero when he became
a stake missionary.
The state court divided the hardware store proceeds of approximately 5182,000 equally and
entered the judgment for it as alimony, divided an account evenly so that Plaintiff received $58,000,
and awarded her attorney fees. It also appears Plaintiff was awarded S800 per month support for two
years. Debtor appealed the decision, which was substantially affirmed, and then retried the matter.
During the proceedings, Debtor mode afraudulenttransfer of real property to his son, which the
court voided In violation of the court's order, Debtor dissipated a Merrill Lynch account by writing
checks to family members andfriends.At one time, it appears the account had in excess of 5300,000.
Debtor and Plaintiff are both members of the Mormon church, and Debtor now lives in
Branson, Missouri, where he has volunteered to serve as afidl-timelay missionary, known as a "stake
missionary." This position produces no income, and Debtor claims he now has no income and lives
off the charity of friends. Plaintiff works as a church secretary and rents out a room in her home for
extra income.
On February 13, 1995, Debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy seeking discharge of his debts,

3

including that owed to Plaintiff which was listed in the schedules at S2I6,0I1.478. Other than the
debt to plaintiff most of the other scheduled debts were for attorney fees to numerous attorneys. In
addition, two iriends, 3randy and Charies Nichoi, were listed with two unspecified claims totaling
$11,200.00.

At trial Debtor testified the Nichols' debts were for helping him prepare court

documents.

PISCUSSIQN
1. Dischargeability qnder § 52?(aKg)
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5)(1994) provides, in pertinent part, that:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtor from any debtit

*

•

(5) to a . . . former spouse . . . of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse . . . in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of
record....
The issues to be decided before this court are judged by the standard of preponderance of evidence.
Grogan v. Garner. I l l S.Ct 654 (1991).
The evidence indicates the awards made to Plaintiff and ordered to be paid by Debtor were
intended as support. While the court does not disregard the Decree Of Dissolution Of Marriage
issued by the Utah state court, nothing in the Decree is conclusive on the issues tried by the
Bankruptcy Court. See In re Williams. 703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Ianker 185 B JL 297
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995). A statement in a decree of dissolution of marriage that neither party is
awarded support is not a limiting factor binding on the bankruptcy court. SffiS, Holiday v. Kline.. 63
F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1983). This court's findings are

4

consistent with the findings of the Fourth Judiciai District Court of Wasatch County, Utah.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of an issue in a later lawsuit by the
party against whom the issue was decided in the previous adjudication. Swap shire v. 3aerf 365 F.2d
948, 950 (8th Cir. 1989). The element of collateral estoppel are: 1) the issue decided in the prior
adjudication is identical to the issue in the present case; 2) the prior adjudication resulted in a
judgment on the merits; 3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party to the prior lawsuit; and 4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted
had a full and fair opportunity to Etigate the issue in the previous suit. Swapshire, 865 F.2d at 951,
citing Gates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America 583 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. 1979). The elements of collateral
estoppel are satisfied in the present case regarding the support nature of the award.
The issues in this adversary action as to division of marital property and debts, and
determination of awards in the nature of support, are the same as those which were comprehensively
and thoroughly litigated throughout the Utah court system by these same parties. Plaintiff presented
credible testimony and evidence before this court that the exhibits presented and accepted into
evidence in this proceeding were used before the courts in Utah to determine the support issue. The
decision by the District Court of Wasatch County, Utah on retrial, which was a decision on the
merits, makes clear that the obligations of Debtor to Plaintiff were for her support. Debtbr had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate all the issues in the Utah state courts, and in fact has avsfiled himself
of the opportunities to engage in extensive litigation in Utah.
Even without the benefit of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this court's ruling in favor of
Plaintiff and against Debtor would be the same. The court hasi considered the numerous faotors set
forth in In re Soval, 171 B.R. 690, 692 (Bankr. E.D: Mo. 1987), in determining the dischargeability
under § 523(aX5) of the debt owed Plaintiff by Debtor. Plaintiff has met the burden t)f f root under
5

the Soval analysis to show that the obligations ordered by the Utah court to be paid by Debtor to
Plaintiff or for her benefit were intended :o have a support function and are, therefore,
nondischargeable obligations under §523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Plaintiff has poor earning capacity and is not employed
at the same job she held at the time of the Utah retriai. The Utah court did not believe :Plaintiff had
a surplus of funds by which she could support herself. Debtor, on the other hand, has business
experience and has had at least two businesses which have generated substantial profits. Debtor's
earning capacity is actually much greater than that found by the Utah court. During Debtor's life, he
has generated a significant amount of income and assets.

If Dischargeability under § 523(a)(l$)
The obligations are also nondischargeable pursuant to
§ 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.CA. § 523(a)(15)(1994) provides, in pertinent part,
that:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does
not discharge an individual debtorfromany debt-

(15). . . that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record... unless(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such
debt from income or property of the debtor not
reasonably necessary to be expended for the
maintenance or support of the debtor...; or
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to
the debtor that outweighs the detrimental
consequences to a . . . former
spouse....

6

Under the provisions of § 523(aXl5), the burden is on Debtor to show either his inability to pay the
joint indebtedness or to show that the benefit to Debtor of receiving a discharge of these debts
outweighs the detriment to Plaintiff irom Debtors non-payment of the debts. SeeT In re Becker, 185
B.R. 567 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). Debtor has made no such showing under either prong.
In re Fiona 187 BJR. 554, 656-658 (Bankr, W.D. Mo. 1995), ;s adopted by this court for the
proposition that the ability to pay under § 523(a)(!5) does not necessarily mean at the time of the
trial, but requires the court to consider debtor's future earning capacity. Here, Debtor has voluntarily
placed himself in a position of earning less income - - virtually no income, in fact - • and then claims
he is unable to pay his debts. Debtor's decision to become a stake missionary in his church is his
decision alone.1 He chose to place himself in a position of voluntary retirement several years ago.
Debtor receives no compensation from his church. Taking a voluntary retirement and working in a
voluntary position for the church or a charitable or civic institution is a luxury many people would
like to be able to afford. Debtor is not prohibited from making such life-choice decisions, but he
cannot do so in order to render himself a pauper in an effort to avoid the lawful support obligations
rendered by the Utah dissolution court, or while seeking the protection of the bankruptcy court as
a [means to avoid those support obligations. When the obligations to Plaintiff are satisfied, Debtor
isifree to make such life-choices.

1

Debtor testified that if the stake president asked a person to volunteer to be a stake
missionary, it was actually a command or request that one did not decline. Debtor testified that
he was asked to do this by the stake president, but he could not remember the president's name.
Plaintiffs counsel questioned Plaintiff about whether Debtor was called by the stake president to
be a stake missionary or whether he volunteered. Debtor's objection to the question was
sustained However, it appears the testimony should have been admitted because Debtor
introduced the issue and relied on hearsay testimony to assert that the stake president asked him
ta be a stake missionary. Therefore, Plaintiff should have been allowed to testify that the stake
president informed her he did not ask Debtor, but that Debtor volunteered for mission work.

7

Debtor raised medical issues as a reason it would be more detrimental to him to enforce the
obligations and why he could not pay the obligations . Debtor presented no expert testimony or
medical evidence of such conditions and there is no evidence that Debtor is disabled or is in any
manner unable to work. The court observed Debtor during a period of two days and he appeared fit
and fully able to function, which he apparently does in his full-time volunteer endeavor. Although
Debtor claims to have disc problems, many people have such back problems and are able to get along
with their daily lives and employment. In fact, Debtor is an avid golfer and continues to play goif
in spite of his claimed disability. Additionally, Debtor is able to perform his full-time job as a
voluntary stake missionary, his normal daily activities, and odd jobs. Debtor did not establish an
inability to pay sufficient to satisfy thefirstprong of § 523(aX15).
Analysis of the second prong of § 523(a)(15) indicates that the detriment to Plaintiff
outweighs the benefit of discharge to the Defendant. As previously noted, Plaintiff does not have
significant earning capacity. By contrast, Debtor has years of business experience and has had at
least two lucrative businesses which have made substantial profits. He has previously generated
significant income and assets. Debtor has greater income capacity but chooses not to work. Plaintiff
also at one time wished to be a volunteer missionary, but instead now works as a church secretary
and rents out a room in her home to meet ordinary living expenses. Debtor suggests that Plaintiff
should look to her children for support, but Debtor's support obligations are not discharged by any
acts of charityfromPlaintiffs children.

3. Pcbtort Credibility
Debtor's previous lack of honesty and deceptive actions reflect on his credibility. Plaintiff
testified that during the marriage Debtor kept significant sums of cash hidden in the home,. Once,
she unexpectedly came across $52,000 in cash hidden inside the bathroom cabinet behind the drawers.
8

Debtor toid her at that time the cash was takenfromthe register (and apparently was not reported
to tax authorities) at the hardware store the coupie ownea. This testimony was basically undisputed.
The coupie took their personal problem over Debtor hiding money from his spouse to their bishop.
Plaintiff and Debtor apparently split the 552.900 after their bishop advised them to do so.
The District Court of Wasatch County found Debtor made at least one fraudulent transfer
within his family. The court voided that transfer. The state court prohibited Debtor from disbursing
funds, yet in violation of that order, Debtor made a transfer of S6,000 to 510,000 to his children out
of the funds. He made the transfer because Plaintiff made a gift of money to her children before the
divorce. Plaintiff testified the transfer to her children wasfromher half of the hidden 552,000 that
the bishop split between the parties. In contrast, Debtor's transfers to his family members and
children after initiation of the dissolution proceedings were madefromthe marital assets Debtor had
been enjoinedfromdisbursing Whether there was a specific order in effect from the state court judge
at that time, one would know generally in a divorce proceeding where assets are being divided that
it is improper to take assets and convey them to family members. If Debtor conveyed marital assets
in order to keep them out of Plaintiffs reach, the conveyance constituted afraudulenttransfer.
Evidence came in without objection that in 1984, Debtor was indicted in federal court in
Wyoming for actions involving commercial fraud Debtor and a third party attempted to obtain funds
from a bank in payment for bogus merchandise orders to the third party. Debtor would apparently
receive a checkfromthe bank and then sign a lien waiver, which he then sent back to the bank. No
merchandise was delivered, so the lien waiver was essentially false. The court notes that the
information came into evidence without objection. The case did not go to trial and there was no
conviction because Debtor entered into a pretrial diversion agreement wherein he was put on
probation for one year and required to pay restitution of 525,000. Pursuant to the diversion
9

agreement, if at the end of that time Debtor had compiled with the agreement, the charges would be
dismissed. Debtor was not prosecuted because he made restitution and complied with the otner
requirements of the agreement.
There was also evidence that Debtor forged Plaintiffs name on at least two occasions, once
to a check and once to a document that released Plaintiffs money from a Meniil-Lynch bank account.
In regard to the check, the court notes that a photocopy of the check was produced at trial and it was
not possible to determinefromthe copy whether it was her signature or a copy of her signature. The
questions asked by Debtor's attorney in regard to the checking account, however, did not directly
dispute that there had been a transfer out of the bank account. The questions went to whether there
had been any ultimate or permanent loss incurred because of the check written out of the account.
Plaintiff on the other hand, was not trying to establish that there had been an ultimate loss, but that
there had been a tendency to make false transactions, to forge names and to engage in fraudulent
activity. The $30,000 from the allegedly forged check were later returned to her account, which was
a joint account with Debtor. Plaintiff indicated that Debtor was the only other person who had access
to the checks and who could have forged her name. The court makes no specific finding that a
forgery occurred, based upon the earlier reference about the photocopy of the check, but notes there
was not a denial that it occurred, only testimony that no permanent loss resulted. Plaintiff also
testified that during the time of the dissolution proceedings, a real estate lot was transferred to
Debtor's son. The transfer was accomplished by Debtor forging his son's name while the son was
on an obligatory mission outside the State of Utah,
Debtor's credibility is also suspect in regard to allegations that he lives at this point in his life
totally without income and dependent on the charity of others. The court notes that Debtor claimed
the estimated $450 a month income that he listed in his schedules was, in feet, the value of charitable
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donationsfromfriendswho support him and occasionally ailow him to stay at their houses white he
engages in his stake missionary work In examining the other facts in this case, such as debtors
previous income and his propensity for hiding cash and transferring assets to family members, it
appears that Debtor has had a partem and pracnce of accumulating large amounts of money in forms
that are difficult to trace, as evidenced by the 552,000 in cash skimmed from his business. Debtor
has had a practice of accounting loosely or not at all for such funds. Debtor's allegations that he lives
totally without any income and solely on the charity of others is not consistent with the other facts
in the case.
An issue arose during Debtor's cross-examination of Plaintiff that shed additional light on
Debtor's credibility and motive. Debtor's counsel, after conferring with Debtor, attempted to ask
whether Plaintiff had engaged in extensive litigation in her divorcefromher first husband. Her first
husband was an Air Force doctor and their long-term marriage resulted in six children. After
Plaintiffs counsel objected, Debtor's counsel explained that the reason for the question was to show
Plaintiffs custom and practice of being a professional litigator or "black widow" who engaged
husbands in divorces and then litigated until she got their money. Debtor's argument that Plaintiff
had a scheme to bilk innocent men of their assets is ludicrous. In actually applying the argument to
Plaintiffsfirstmarriage, the scenario portrayed would be that Plaintiff entered into her first marriage
of 20 years, and gave birth to and reared six children while following her spousefromair base to air
base, in order to bilk her former spouse of the small pension she was awarded in the dissolution of
marriage.
There was absolutely no evidence to support the assertion of any such practice by Plaintiff.
The true significance of such a question is the questioner's own motivation. Debtor's question invites
examination of his own thinking, his own state of mind and his own actions. In examining all the
11

circumstances leading up to the bankruptcy trial, the court conciudes the litigation was protracted and
multiplied by Debtor and not by Plaintiff if there is any custom and practice of being ai professional
litigator, it is on Debtor's part, as he has taken his case to three different courts in Utah and one
Missouri court, all with the consistent result that the courts ruled adversely to Debtor's position.
During these protracted judicial proceedings, he dissipated and diverted the marital a* sets and has
avoided paying Plaintiff Debtor appealed the first decision of the Utah state court. -The court of
appeals rendered an adverse decision to Debtor, who then went back for a second trial. He eventually
filed bankruptcy, again in order to upset the Utah court's decision. 3y Sling the bankruptcy, he
forced Plaintiff tofilethe adversary action to protect the judgment she obtained in Utah. I It is not fair
to suggest that Plaintiff has engaged in bad faith litigation because she has been placed in the position
of having to protect her judgment which Debtor has tried to take away and which, by devious means
and dissipation of assets, he has avoided paying.

Moreover it is just as likely that one could

examine Debtor's behavior and conclude that his* practice was to enter into a short-tdrm marriage
with someone who appeared lonely and vulnerable and had $50,000 so that Debtor iouid get the
money and then leave. The question backfired on Debtor and provided a revealing key to his state
of mind
Debtor's true reasons for contesting his support obligations do not arisefroman honest belief
that the state court judges were erroneous in their decisions regarding the obligations] or that he is
truly unable to pay the obligation and that a discharge would be more beneficial]to him than
detrimental to Plaintiff The key to Debtor's true reason for contesting the debt surfaced at the end
of examination by his counsd. Debtor was asked a question regarding his puipose in attempting to
discharge his obligations to Plaintiff Debtor's answer was spontaneous and damaging. He said that
he simply refused to believe judges have therightto distribute any of his assets to Plaintiff because
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he knew they were his own premarital property. Debtor claimed he was right and the judges were
wrong. In effect, Debtor claims to be above the law, a state of mind which is consistent with his
previous actions, such as makingfraudulenttransfers, dissipating assets despite the judges order, and
skimming profits from his business without disclosing the hidden funds either to his spouse or the tax
authorities.
Debtor has a strong subjective belief that so far, ail the judges who have looked at the case
must be wrong because they do not agree with him. All the triai and appellate judge* in Utah and
now the bankruptcy court in Missouri have agreed in theirfindingsagainst Debtor. At some point,
Debtor must realize that, especially where he has sought out the protection of the court} he is bound
by that judgment
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
1. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff Marilyn Johnson and against Defenjiant-Debtor
George Bryce Rappleye in the amount of $216,011:47, the amount scheduled in thisi bankruptcy
proceeding, with prepedtion and post-petition interest at the rate specified in the decree of dissolution
of marriage, or in the absence of such rate in the decree, at the rate provided pursuant Vp Utah law,
plus costs.
2. The judgment entered herein is not dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S,C. §
523(a)((5) and § 523 <a)(15).

Karen M. See, Bankruptcy Judge
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STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073)
J. BRYAN QUESENBERRY (9156)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1361 S. Highway 40 P.O. Box 730 Heber City, Utah 84032
MARILYN RAPPLEYE, nka,
MARILYN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

]
])
)
;

STIPULATION AND ORDER RE:
SUPERSEDEAS BOND

vs.

]

GEORGE RAPPLEYE,

])

Case No. 6626

]i

Judge Donald Eyre

Defendant.

Plaintiff, Marilyn Johnson ("Plaintiff), by and through her counsel of record, Matt C.
Osborne, Osborne & Barnhill, P.C., and Defendant George Bryce Rappleye ("Defendant") and
Linda Jean Hodges-Rappleye, by and through Defendant's counsel of record and HodgesRappleye's counsel, Stephen Quesenberry, Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, hereby enter into the
following stipulation, and request immediate entry of the order incorporated herein, regarding the
posting of a supersedas bond.

.v*S

RECITALS
1.

On January 8, 2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

on Defendant's Request for Hearing and Motion to Set Aside and Release the Writ of Execution
filed in connection with, among other things, a certain Writ of Execution served on Fidelity
Investments on October 28, 2001, entering findings of fact and conclusions of law among other
things:
a.

The Branson Lake Property, as that term is defined therein, was sold for

$440,000.00, and Defendant had a 48.39 percent interest in the sales proceeds of the
Branson Lake Property, or up to $212,916.00;
b.

Plaintiff may execute on Defendants' share of the proceeds of the sale of the

Branson Lake Property up to the amount of the Judgment;
c.

Plaintiff is entitled to execute up to the amount of her Judgment on Defendant's

48.39 percent interest in Fidelity Investment Accounts #X29-179590, #X01-058866,
#X33-089737, #X29-106640 and X29-203807; and
d.

Defendant's 48.39 percent interest in Fidelity Investment Accounts #X29-179590,

#X01-058866, #X33-089737, #X29-106640 and X29-203807 shall be computed by
taking the outstanding balances of the accounts on October 26, 2002, prior to the
withdrawal of $100,000.00 (which was ordered by the Court in or around January, 2002);
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2.

The Court entered an Order of Execution on January 8,2003, ordering, among

other things, the following:
a.

Plaintiff is entitled to execute up to the amount of her Judgment on Defendant's
48.39 percent interest in Fidelity Investment Accounts #X29-179590, #X01058866, #X33-089737, #X29-106640 and X29-203807; and

b.

Defendant's 48.39 percent interest in Fidelity Investment Accounts #X29-179590,
#X01-058866, #X33-089737, #X29-106640 and X29-203807 shall be computed
by taking the outstanding balances of the accounts on October 26,2001, the date
the funds were frozen pursuant to the Writ of Execution.

3.

Plaintiff filed an Abstract of Judgment in Fifth Judicial District Court in and for

Washington County, State of Utah, on or about May 1,2002;
4.

Plaintiff caused a Writ of Execution to be issued by the Fifth District Court on or

around July 31, 2002 ("Washing County Writ of Execution");
5.

The Praecipe attached to the Washington County Writ of Execution listed the

residence located at 1015 South River Road, St. George, Utah ("St. George Property"), and any
non-exempt personal property located thereon;
6.

The Washington County Writ of Execution was served upon Defendant on or

around August 6,2002;

v
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7.

The Court has ordered that the supersedeas bond (pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 62(d)) in this matter) should be in the amount of $230,000.00. This bond would
effect a stay on the execution of the January 8, 2003 order of the Court regarding the Fidelity
Accounts referenced in the Order of Execution, but would not act as a stay on Plaintiffs
execution on the judgment Plaintiff has against Defendant in this case generally;
8.

The reason for the- $230,000.00 bond was to provide sufficient surety to cover the

amount of Defendant's 48.39% interest in the proceeds of the sale of the Branson Lake Property,
to wit: $212,916.00, plus anticipated costs and attorney fees on appeal;
9.

The other primary asset which was purchased with the proceeds from the sale of

the Branson Lake Property is the St. George Property;
10.

Defendant and Linda Jean Hodges-Rappleye ("Hodges-Rappleye") have admitted

that the St. George Property was purchased solely with the proceeds of the sale of the Branson
Lake Property; and
11.

Plaintiff, Defendant and Hodges-Rappleye desire to resolve all issued related to

the St. George Property in the present action and ensuing appeal so that further fees and costs
may be avoided in connection with the Washington County Execution.
WHEREAS, the parties stipulate and agree as follows:
1,

Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Defendant will pay $230,000.00 into the

Registry of the Court as security in lieu of a supersedeas bond, pursuant to Rule 62(i)(2), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. This payment would effect a stay on the execution of the January 8,
4

2003 order of the Court regarding the Fidelity Investment Accounts referenced in the Order of
Execution, but would not act as a stay on Plaintiffs execution on the judgment Plaintiff has
against Defendant in this case generally.
2.

The $230,000.00 to be deposited with the Court shall only be released from the

Registry upon order of the Court.
3.

The $230,000.00 to be deposited with the Court shall come from the Fidelity

Investment Accounts referenced in the Court's Order of Execution, with the specific instructions
set forth below.
4.

Plaintiff shall have the right to apply to the Court for additional sureties in the

event it appears that the $230,000.00 will be insufficient to cover the attorney fees and costs of
the appeal.
5.

It is the express and specific intent of Plaintiff, Defendant and Hodges-Rappleye

that $212,916.00 of the $230,000.00 to be deposited with the Court represents Defendant's
48.39% of the proceeds of the sale of the Branson Lake Property. The remaining proceeds of the
sale of the Branson Lake Property are the sole and separate property of Hodges-Rappleye.
6.

It is the express and specific intent of Plaintiff, Defendant and Hodges-Rappleye

that the $230,000.00 includes any interest of Defendant in the St. George Property; it is the
express and specific intent of the parties that the Court shall have jurisdiction over that money.
7.

In exchange for the release of the Washington County Writ of Execution and

Plaintiffs agreement not to take further action against the St. George Property, Defendant and
5

Hodges-Rappleye agree that $212,916.00 of the $230,000.00 to be deposited shall be released to
Plaintiff if she prevails on appeal, plus any additional amount established as attorney fees,
interest, and costs on appeal.
8.

Plaintiff agrees that the Fidelity Investment Accounts, the 1991 GMC van and St.

George Property shall be free from any further orders of the court once the $230,000.00 has been
deposited into the Court's registry.
9.

Plaintiff agrees not to take any action, other than the present case, against the

Fidelity Investment Accounts, St. George Property and 1991 GMC Van.
10.

Plaintiff, Defendant and Hodges agree that Fidelity Brokerage Services, L.L.C.,

be ordered and instructed to pay the sum of $230,000.00 to the Registry of the Court, Fourth
Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, Utah, with the above-described case number noted on
the check, at Post Office Box 730, Heber City, UT 84660, or to hand-deliver said funds to said
court at 1361 South Highway 40, Heber City, UT. This money shall be paid by liquidating the
entire amount of Fidelity account X29-106640 (approximately $200,000.00), with the remainder
of the $230,000.00 bond to come from the Fidelity account X29-20387. The total transferred by
Fidelity Brokerage Services, L.L.C. should equal $230,000.00.
11.

The parties further agree that the Court's Order of Execution instructing Fidelity

Investments to pay these funds to the Plaintiff is to be disregarded by Fidelity Investments, and
only the Order set forth below is to be followed with regard to the funds.

OSBORNE & BARNHELL, P.C.
Matt Osborne
Attorneys for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Marilyn Johnson (Affiant), being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says that
Affiant is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, that Affiant has read the foregoing Stipulation
and understands the contents thereof, and that the same are true of Affiant's own knowledge,
information, and belief. Affiant hereby agrees to the terms of the stipulation.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j f l ^ day of January, 2003
_ _"2^3
~ , «—,
asa
i _rpn
C-3 —•*
"tcrr—-i
i ~<~* —r , rra
t
t

o r ij

*M^ commission expires: ~
- :- -st
a

Notary Public
Residing at

County, Salt Lake

\

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

day of January, 2003.

My coir mission expires:
Notary Public
Residing at

County. Salt Lake

STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OF

ss.
)

George Bryec Rappleye (Affiant), being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says
that Affiant is the Defendant in the above-entitled action, that Affiant has read the foregoing
Stipulation and understands the contents thereof, and that the same arc true of Affiant's own
knowledge, infonnalion, and belief. Affiant hereby agrees to the terms of tjje stipulation.

iEORCE BRYCIt RArPLEYE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this l 4 day of January, 2003
My commission expires:

NOTARY PLirfUt
DENNY STEWART

Notary Public
Residing at iAl2£Liii^M>County

. 717 South f!:vei M
Saint George, Utah 84 ?3
MyCommissio- Zx;-',ttn.

February 1s ;o06

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNT V OF»A)fl4>n^0 *L)

ry, ^
\V

1 Jnda Jean Hodges-Rappleye (Affiant), being first duly sworn tinder oath, deposes and
says that Affiant is a Party to the above-referenced Stipulation in the above-entitled action, that
Affiant has read the foregoing wStipulation and understands the contents thereof, and that the same
are true of Affiant's own knowledge, information, and belief, Affiont hereby agrees to the terms
of the stipulation.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this fff
My commission expires:

day of January, 2003.

pMj 4 K
Notary Public
Residing at WC^hiM^/0k\ County

NOTARY PUBLIC
DENNY STEWART

w

„__
<£;

717 South River Rd
Saint George, Utah 84730
My Commission Expires

February 15, 20u6

STATE OF UTAH

I-::

Tito i.uuuui-otipulation is hsrvby an ord.tr of the Court; and

2,

KaintifF, Defendant and Hodgea and thiol pou'.m dull follow said stipulation-.

ORDERED this

day of January, 2003.

Approved as to form:

Matt C. Osborne
Attorney for Plaintiff

H^J

ORDER
Based on the above stipulation, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
1.

Fidelity Brokerage Services, L.L.C., is hereby ordered and instructed to pay the

sum of $230,000.00 to the Registry of the Court, Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County,
Utah, with the above-described case number noted on the check, at Post Office Box 730, Heber
City, UT 84660, or to hand-deliver said funds to said court at 1361 South Highway 40, Heber
City, UT. This money shall be paid by liquidating the entire amount of Fidelity account X29106640 (approximately $200,000.00), with the remainder of the $230,000.00 bond to come from
the Fidelity account X29-20387. The total transferred by Fidelity Brokerage Services, L.L.C.
should equal $230,000.00.
2.

The remaining terms of the parties' stipulation is hereby incorporated into and

made part of this order of the Court; and
3.

Plaintiff, Defendant and HodgepyR^^

shall follow said stipulation.

ORDERED this C- ' day of January, 200 JJ,

.Approved as to form:
./

Matrur Osborne
Attorney for Plaintiff

)rney
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Matt C. Osborne, USB NO. 7271
OSBORNE & BARNHILL, P.C
11576 South State, Bldg. 1001
Draper, Utah 84020-9453
Telephone: (801) 571-2555
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARILYN RAPPLEYE kna MARILYN
JOHNSON,

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Plaintiff,
v.
GEORGE BRYCE RAPPLEYE,

Case No. 6626
Judge Guy R. Burningham

Defendant.

1.
( i/)

Complete paragraph one if you claim the property executed upon is exempt:
(a).
The property which has been executed upon is exempt form execution
because it is (Check applicable boxes:)
) Homestead up to the amount allowed by law
) A motor vehicle used in my trade or business and having a value
below that allowed by law
) Tools of the trade
) Social Security Benefits
_) Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
J Veterans' Benefits
J Unemployment Benefits
J Worker's Compensation Benefits
J Public Assistance (Welfare)
J Alimony or Child Support
J Pensions

(
) Wages or other earnings from personal services
(
) Owned by another person
(
) Only partly owned by me
( _ _ ) Certain tools of the trade below the value allowed by law
(__ ) Certain furnishings and appliances
(
) Certain musical instruments
(
) Certain heirlooms
(
) Other (describe):

2.

Complete paragraph two if you believe the Writ of Execution was improperly

issued:
(

) a.

I believe that the writ of execution was issued improperly. (Explain) _

( t Q b.

Check if applicable: I claim ownership of all or part of the property taken
and I am not one of the persons against whom a judgment has been
entered.

(

Check if applicable: I do not own the property taken

) c.

I REQUEST THAT THIS MATTER BE SET FOR A HEARING.
THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS REQUEST ARE TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF.
Dated this jo^

day of ^g_cjL,Tv^ft-% , 2001.
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